Saturday, October 24, 2026

Arctic Vigilance: Polar Region Nations Unite And Boost Countermeasures – Analysis



A Royal Canadian Air Force CF-188 Hornet takes off at Pituffik Space Base, Greenland, in January 2026, in support of Operation Noble Defender, an air defense mission conducted under the direction of the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
 [MASTER CPL. BÉLYNDA CASSE/ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE]

October 24, 2026

By The Watch

Key Takeaways:

Sino-Finnish Arctic cooperation has cooled sharply since the 2019 pact, with the 2025-2029 Joint Action Plan omitting the region entirely amid Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accessions, Baltic cable severings linked to Chinese and Russian vessels, and broader wariness of China’s support for Russia.

Arctic NATO members have responded with icebreaker expansions under the U.S.-Canada-Finland ICE Pact, higher defense budgets, new surveillance and missile capabilities, and enhanced NORDEFCO coordination, while restricting Chinese infrastructure bids such as airport projects in Greenland.

China’s dual-use research stations, survey fleets, and Northern Sea Route collaboration with Russia continue, yet analysts note limited Arctic power projection and growing skepticism over military-civil fusion and undersea mapping that could aid submarine operations.


Deepening cooperation in law, scientific research and marine technology in the Arctic were highlights of a 2019 pact between China and Finland. The relationship, as it pertains to the polar region, has since cooled. The nations’ 2025-2029 Joint Action Plan does not mention the Arctic.

When Finnish President Alexander Stubb visited Beijing in October 2024, mutual praise flowed at formal gatherings. But down-to-business meetings centered on Russia’s war with Ukraine and Beijing’s thinly veiled support of Moscow, a scenario that concerns Helsinki. Leaders ultimately approved measures on relatively benign issues such as trade, the environment and education.

The 2025-2029 strategy is just five pages, compared with the 30-page 2019 Sino-Finnish agreement that detailed joint initiatives in the region. “Overall, the focal points of the [Joint Action Plan] give an impression of shrinking cooperation,” the Norway-based High North News newspaper reported in November 2024.

What happened? Most prominently, the Russia-Ukraine war began in February 2022, transforming the region’s geopolitical and security environment. Amid concerns about its security, Finland, which has Europe’s longest border with Russia (1,340 kilometers), joined NATO in April 2023, followed by neighboring Sweden in March 2024. Baltic Sea data cables, a gas pipeline and a power cable were severed, under suspicious circumstances, in 2023 and 2024 by commercial ships linked to China and Russia. The sea borders Denmark, Finland, Sweden and other European nations.

Other Arctic nations also became wary of China, which has served as Russia’s High North proxy while the Kremlin wages its war with Ukraine. “The more China supports Russia, the more difficult the relationship with Europe, and especially the European Union, becomes,” Stubb said.

In some respects, China still feels the fallout from its 2018 self-depiction as a “near-Arctic” state, a portrayal that rankled countries with territory inside the Arctic Circle. China’s northern border is almost 1,500 kilometers outside the Arctic Circle.

All eight members of the multinational Arctic Council, a forum that promotes cooperation, coordination and interaction, initially were enthused about China’s interest in the region. The forum includes Russia and seven NATO states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. China is among the Arctic Circle’s 13 nonvoting observer nations, along with the Indo-Pacific countries of India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea.


Opinions about China among government officials and the public in the forum’s NATO countries have spiraled downward in recent years, influenced by Beijing’s increased links to Moscow, the nation with the most Arctic exposure, Trym Eiterjord, a Vancouver, Canada, researcher with The Arctic Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, said. “A lot of stuff has happened in the past year,” Eiterjord said in December 2025. “A lot of it, at least when it comes to China, has been reactions from Arctic countries, from NATO countries.”

Many of China’s forays into the Arctic — proposals to build power plants, airports and seaports in the extreme environment — have failed or remain on hold due to market factors, environmental hurdles, geopolitical challenges and security concerns. Its naval exercises with Russia trouble regional nations, as do Beijing’s human rights abuses in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang, and its aggressive maritime actions in the Indo-Pacific.

The Sino-Russian naval exercises in the Arctic, and especially in international waters off Alaska’s coast, might partly be swipes at the U.S., which has condemned China’s hostile actions in the East China and South China seas, Eiterjord said. The U.S. and its allies and partners routinely transit the two seas to demonstrate freedom of navigation. Beijing illegally claims most of the South China Sea, where its Coast Guard ships have rammed, blocked and directed water cannons and lasers at other nations’ fishing boats and government vessels, particularly those of the Philippines. China also claims Japanese territory in the East China Sea.

China’s Arctic explorations echo research missions and academic assessments that preceded Beijing’s military expansion in the South China Sea, The Wall Street Journal newspaper reported in December 2025. China has built artificial features in the South China Sea that support military air bases.


Beijing has become less concerned about appearances in the Arctic. It no longer prioritizes impressing multilateral groups such as the Arctic Council. It now favors bilateral relations with Arctic nations and remains a key trade partner. Despite its remoteness, China has established a presence in the Arctic, using land-based research outposts and a fleet of oceanographic survey ships to explore sea topography, circumpolar features and space. It also participates in a regional group that opposes unregulated fishing, even though China’s distant-water fishing fleet has been linked to such illicit activity globally.

Still, there’s increasing skepticism about Beijing’s intentions. “China’s overtures have been met with suspicion in the Arctic states, where some analysts and commentators read nefarious intent into Chinese actions and statements,” the U.S.-based Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center reported in June 2025. “China’s construction of critical infrastructure and investments in the strategically located and resource-rich Arctic have raised concerns about national security. … What is more, questions abound about the dual-use applicability of Chinese research activities in the region.”
Countermeasures

Finland is among the states enhancing asymmetrical defense capabilities in response to increased tensions. Expanding icebreaker fleets is part of that buildup. Canada, Finland and the U.S. in November 2025 celebrated advancement of their Icebreaker Collaboration Effort Pact. The endeavor aims to design, produce and maintain Arctic and polar icebreakers, as well as other capabilities — maritime operations for advanced navigation, remote sensing and environmental monitoring — by increasing information exchange, industrial collaboration and operational knowledge.

Finland, which will build icebreakers for Canadian and U.S. forces, has at least eight of the polar-capable ships, while Canada has 18 and the U.S. has three. China reportedly has five icebreakers and Russia more than 40.

Stubb and U.S. President Donald Trump reached a deal in October 2025 for Finland to build up to 11 icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard, with the initial four assembled in Finland and the remaining vessels built in U.S. shipyards using Finnish expertise.

Canada, which has built icebreakers for decades, has revitalized its shipbuilding industry and continues to work closely with shipbuilders and supply chains, Ottawa reported in December 2025.

Along with acquiring icebreakers, Canada will appoint an Arctic ambassador and open consulates in Anchorage, Alaska, and Nuuk, Greenland, Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand told the Reuters news agency, adding that the Arctic is Canada’s top foreign policy priority. Prime Minister Mark Carney plans to raise the defense budget to 5% of gross domestic product by 2035 as Canada prioritizes stronger international partnerships and an enhanced military.

“Canada is a sovereign nation, but that sovereignty is under new and growing pressures,” Defence Minister David McGuinty said in May 2025. “As an Arctic nation, we must protect our northernmost regions and strengthen our presence in a warming Arctic.”


Denmark is bolstering its security while resisting Chinese investments in Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory, including successfully pressuring the state-owned China Communications Construction Co. to withdraw its bid to build and manage Greenland’s airports. Denmark is partially funding the projects.

Copenhagen will raise defense spending by $4.2 billion to improve security in Greenland, the Arctic and the North Atlantic. It also will add 16 U.S.-built F-35 fighter jets to its fleet of 43 to “significantly strengthen” the Danish Armed Forces, Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated.

Denmark will protect its strategically important maritime choke points. The country has contracted to buy coastal defense missile systems from Norway for more than $117 million, with first deliveries anticipated in 2026, Defense News magazine reported.

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden comprise the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) group to strengthen “national defense, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions.” NORDEFCO’s Vision 2025 plan calls for cooperation among the nations in peacetime, crisis or conflict, and especially to deter terror, cyber and hybrid threats.

“The Nordics work very, very well together,” Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, an associate professor at Canada’s St. Francis Xavier University whose research includes Arctic sovereignty and security, said. “They’ve got a single common view of what needs to be done and are moving in a fairly coordinated fashion.”

Norway’s 2025-2036 Defence Plan pledges increased defense spending and asserts that “maintaining situational awareness in the High North and in the North Atlantic is paramount.” The plan calls for increased maritime security capabilities, including acquiring at least five new frigates and five submarines, to protect Norway’s more than 100,000 kilometers of mainland, island and fjord coastlines.

Oslo will buy satellites and long-range surveillance drones, and bolster air defenses with ground-based systems and other capabilities. The Norwegian Army will expand by two brigades, buy long-range precision fires and helicopters, and increase stocks of munitions, spare parts, fuel and equipment. “The rise of China is asserting pressure on the prevailing world order and an assertive Russia is challenging the Euro-Atlantic security architecture,” the plan states.

Sweden also will raise defense spending. “We need to scale up production. We need to transform economic clout into combat power as well,” Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson said while meeting with U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Washington, D.C., in December 2025. Jonson said Sweden will provide security and deliver hard power to ensure it defends “every inch of allied territory.”

Along with enhancing its icebreaker fleet, the U.S. will ensure a robust defense to counter Arctic threats, according to an October 2025 White House memorandum that addresses “growing strategic competition, aggressive military posturing, and economic encroachment by foreign adversaries.” Among other military initiatives, the U.S. is enhancing training of personnel and allied forces for polar operations.


The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a Canada-U.S. mutual defense entity, has intercepted Chinese and Russian military aircraft conducting exercises in Alaska’s air defense identification zone.

Iceland, too, is shoring up security capabilities. Under a policy adopted in September 2025, Reykjavik will increase domestic preparedness and cooperation with multinational groups such as NORDEFCO. “Iceland’s remote location, distance and isolation no longer suffice against external threats; they are, instead, creating specific challenges,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, reported in November 2025.

The Arctic’s NATO countries are concerned about China’s growing knowledge of undersea conditions, which could benefit submarine deployments, military experts say.
China’s Arctic Ambitions

Beijing’s portrayal of its involvement in the Arctic as a win-win for itself and other states is becoming more difficult to accept as its relationship with the West sours and its ties with Russia grow, the Wilson Center, a U.S.-based research institute, reported. Beijing and Moscow increasingly are linked in Arctic matters, especially since their leaders declared a “no-limits” strategic partnership days before the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine began. But the authoritarian regimes have different outlooks: While Russia aims to divide other Arctic nations, China seeks to join and influence.

While China’s actions in the Arctic warrant attention, Russia remains the most potentially troublesome actor, observers say. It’s important not to overestimate Beijing’s regional clout, Lajeunesse said. “We have a tendency to treat the Chinese as though they’re a great Arctic power. They’re not.”

With many of its Arctic ambitions unfulfilled, China is focused on steadily building its capacity to operate in the region and using soft power, from economic investments to science diplomacy, to fashion itself as a legitimate stakeholder, the U.S.-based Rand Corp. research group reported in February 2025.

China’s dual-use endeavors are obvious, Eiterjord, of The Arctic Institute, wrote in The Diplomat magazine in April 2025. Under the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy of military-civil fusion, the shipyards that build the nation’s cargo fleet also underpin its rapidly expanding navy, while many of the country’s designers of research vessels also develop its warships.

Satellites, robotic arms and launch systems can serve commercial and military purposes, a U.S. congressional committee reported in November 2025. Unclear distinctions between China’s state-owned enterprises and its nominally private firms add to the confusion.

Among 64 research and survey vessels deployed on Chinese oceanographic missions worldwide since 2020, more than 80% “demonstrated suspect behavior or possess organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda,” the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S.-based policy research group, reported in 2024. Many of the ships operated in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific.


Beijing insists the China-Iceland Joint Arctic Science Observatory near Akureyri, Iceland, and the Yellow River Station, a research outpost in Svalbard, Norway, are purely scientific ventures, but the operations have raised speculation about ulterior motives, The Arctic Institute reported in October 2025.

Much of China’s Arctic effort is aimed at developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) atop Asia for international shipping and acquisition of oil, natural gas, minerals and fish. The undertaking entails collaboration with Russia, and both regimes benefit from an increasingly accessible channel. But Beijing and Moscow differ in their characterization of the Arctic and its maritime passages. While China has called the Arctic the “common heritage of humankind,” Russia, with more than half of the Arctic coastline, takes a possessive stance, insisting it’s the domain of Arctic states.

China provided Russia with a range of goods via the NSR in 2024, including chemicals, construction materials, automobiles and clothing, the U.S. congressional committee reported. Meanwhile, Russian exports to China via the NSR were mostly crude oil and liquefied natural gas, shipments that violate international sanctions against Moscow but help Russia find markets for its energy resources while providing China with inexpensive fuel.

The partnership between China and Russia, especially their military overflights and naval exercises on the polar region’s fringes, concerns Arctic nations. “Strategic competition is one thing, but the flexing of military muscles is a major escalation in tension,” The Arctic Institute reported.


This article was published by The Watch


About The Watch
The Watch is a professional military journal published by United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for foreign partners and allies.
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War At Sea: The Maritime Crisis And The Forgotten Rights Of Seafarers – Analysis



By K.M. Seethi




Key Takeaways:

Escalating conflicts—from Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupting Black Sea grain shipments, to Houthi attacks forcing diversions around the Cape of Good Hope, to the post-28 February 2026 US-Israel-Iran confrontation—have turned major maritime routes including the Strait of Hormuz into conflict zones, trapping approximately 6,000 seafarers and causing deaths, vessel attacks, and prolonged strandings.

International maritime law (UNCLOS, Maritime Labour Convention, San Remo Manual) and naval operations such as Operation Prosperity Guardian provide limited protection, as enforcement is weak, crews face multinational accountability gaps, and militarisation of distress channels and waterways endangers civilian lives and the environment.

The crisis exposes a core contradiction in which global trade relies on roughly two million seafarers, many from developing countries, yet prioritises oil prices and strategic interests over their safety, evacuation rights, and human security, underscoring that freedom of navigation is incomplete without protecting those who sustain it.



The world’s oceans have become ever more dangerous for commercial shipping and the millions of seafarers who sustain international trade. The war in Ukraine, the continuing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran have made some of the world’s busiest maritime routes into conflict zones. Merchant vessels carrying oil, food, fertilisers and other essential commodities have come under missile and drone attacks. Shipping companies have been forced to abandon traditional routes, while thousands of seafarers remain exposed to dangers over which they have little control.

The situation has deteriorated considerably since the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026. The subsequent confrontation has placed the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy corridors, at the centre of a growing maritime crisis. The consequences sprawl beyond rising oil prices, disrupted supply chains and higher insurance costs. They raise critical questions about the safety, dignity and rights of civilian seafarers caught in military conflicts.
From the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf

The maritime crisis acquired a new dimension following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Black Sea became a major theatre of military operations, threatening commercial vessels transporting grain, energy and other commodities. The disruption of Ukrainian grain exports contributed to global food insecurity, particularly in countries dependent on imports from the region.


The Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated in July 2022 with the involvement of Türkiye and the United Nations, temporarily facilitated the movement of Ukrainian agricultural exports. However, Russia’s withdrawal from the agreement in July 2023 renewed uncertainty over commercial navigation. Missile attacks, naval mines and strikes on port infrastructure continued to threaten merchant vessels and their crews.

The war demonstrated how fast civilian shipping could become vulnerable when major powers resorted to military force. Seafarers from countries having no direct involvement in the conflict found themselves exposed to attacks, prolonged confinement and uncertainty over evacuation.

The crisis subsequently spread to another vital maritime region. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, Yemen’s Houthi movement began attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Houthis presented their operations as part of their campaign against Israel and its supporters. However, attacks on merchant vessels placed civilian crews of different nationalities in danger.

The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait form a crucial link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. Before the disruptions, the Suez route carried approximately 12–15 per cent of global maritime trade. Houthi attacks involving anti-ship missiles, drones and other weapons forced major shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. These diversions added thousands of nautical miles to voyages between Asia and Europe. Depending on the route, shipping times increased by one to two weeks. Additional fuel consumption, insurance premiums and operational expenses increased the cost of maritime transportation.


The effects were felt across the conflict zone and the countries dependent on imported food, energy and industrial materials faced additional costs. The longer voyages also increased greenhouse gas emissions, undermining efforts to reduce the environmental impact of international shipping.


The Strait of Hormuz: A Humanitarian Emergency


The confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States has created another serious crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. The narrow waterway connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is indispensable to the transportation of oil and liquefied natural gas from the Gulf. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), approximately 6,000 seafarers remained trapped aboard commercial vessels in the region in October 2026. The organisation’s Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, described the situation as critical and warned that safe navigation could no longer be guaranteed.

Reports published on 22–23 October indicated that the IMO had confirmed approximately 100 maritime incidents as of 9 October, while at least 24 seafarers had been killed since the conflict began on 28 February. Another 24 commercial vessels were reportedly attacked within approximately two weeks.

These figures reveal the seriousness of the situation. They also indicate the limitations of available information. The actual human consequences may be greater because smaller commercial vessels, fishing boats and other maritime workers are not always adequately represented in international reporting.


The attacks on the Singapore-registered vessels GFS Pride and GFS Giselle on 13 and 14 October validated the dangers. GFS Pride reportedly sank after being struck by a projectile, although its 21 crew members survived. GFS Giselle suffered hull damage, and its 22 crew members were evacuated. The immediate question concerns the fate of thousands of seafarers who remain stranded. They are unable to leave their vessels safely, return home or determine when normal commercial operations will resume. The IMO has advised shipping companies to avoid transiting the Strait until credible safety guarantees become available. Yet this warning provides little immediate relief to those already trapped in the conflict zone.

Seafarers as Victims of Geopolitical Conflicts

International maritime trade depends on approximately two million seafarers. A substantial proportion comes from developing countries, including India, the Philippines, Indonesia and other Asian nations. Their labour sustains the movement of commodities that support industrial production and everyday consumption across the world. However, seafarers remain among the most vulnerable workers during international conflicts. They spend long periods away from their families, often under difficult working conditions. When war breaks out, they face dangers that are unimaginable, going beyond the normal risks of maritime employment.


The current crisis has exposed them to missile attacks, drone strikes, naval mines, detention and prolonged confinement. Many experience anxiety over their families, uncertainty about wages and difficulties accessing medical assistance. Evacuation may become impossible when ports are closed or surrounding waters are militarised.

The multinational composition of commercial crews creates additional complications. A vessel may be owned by a company in one country, registered in another, operated from a third and staffed by workers from several countries. This complex arrangement makes accountability difficult when emergencies arise. For Indian seafarers, the crisis has particular significance. India is among the major suppliers of maritime labour to international shipping. Indian nationals serving aboard foreign-flagged vessels may be exposed to conflicts in which India has no military involvement. Their safety depends on shipping companies, flag states, coastal authorities and diplomatic intervention. When these institutions fail to coordinate, the seafarer becomes the weakest party in an increasingly complicated international system. The problem also concerns the right of workers to refuse dangerous assignments. Maritime employment should never require civilian workers to accept the possibility of death merely because commercial contracts must be fulfilled.

Maritime Law and Its Limitations

International law contains several provisions intended to protect commercial navigation and civilian seafarers. However, the present crisis has exposed serious weaknesses in their implementation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes important principles governing navigation. Article 87 recognises freedom of navigation on the high seas, while Article 38 provides for transit passage through straits used for international navigation. These provisions are essential to the functioning of international maritime trade. But they cannot, by themselves, prevent missile attacks, naval blockades or the seizure of commercial vessels.


International humanitarian law also requires parties to armed conflicts to distinguish between military objectives and civilian persons and objects. Merchant vessels ordinarily enjoy civilian protection, although they may lose protection against attack under specific circumstances recognised by the law of armed conflict. The 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides further guidance concerning naval warfare, blockades and the protection of merchant shipping. However, it is not a binding international treaty, and its provisions depend substantially on compliance by states and other parties to conflicts. The Maritime Labour Convention of 2006, adopted under the International Labour Organization, establishes standards concerning seafarers’ employment, health, safety, welfare and working conditions.

Nevertheless, the convention was not designed to resolve military confrontations between states. Its effectiveness depends on implementation by flag states, port authorities and shipping companies. In active war zones, these mechanisms are frequently inadequate.

The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation also addresses serious acts of violence against shipping. Its application to particular incidents depends on the treaty’s jurisdictional provisions and exclusions, including those relating to armed conflict. The major difficulty is therefore one of enforcement. International maritime law recognises important rights and obligations, but there is no effective global mechanism capable of guaranteeing the physical safety of every merchant vessel during armed conflict. The IMO can issue warnings, coordinate assistance and facilitate negotiations. It cannot compel belligerent states or armed groups to cease attacks. Similarly, international labour standards offer protections that become difficult to enforce when commercial shipping enters militarised waters.

Militarisation and the Failure of Maritime Security

The international response to maritime insecurity has relied heavily on naval deployments. The United States and its allies established Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023 to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea. European naval forces have also undertaken defensive operations, while the Indian Navy has maintained a substantial presence in the Arabian Sea and surrounding waters. These deployments have helped protect some commercial vessels and respond to emergencies. However, they have failed to eliminate the threat.

The continuing Houthi attacks demonstrate the limitations of military responses against armed groups operating from coastal territories. Similarly, the confrontation in the Persian Gulf shows how commercial shipping can become vulnerable when naval operations themselves form part of a wider military conflict. The reported dispute over the use of VHF Channel 16, the internationally recognised maritime distress and safety communication channel, illustrates another disturbing development.

Iran has accused American naval forces of using the channel to intimidate civilian crews. The United States maintains that its communications were intended to enforce its naval blockade and provide warnings. The Iranian allegations have not been independently substantiated.


Nevertheless, the controversy raises serious questions about the use of maritime safety systems during military operations. Communication channels intended to protect lives at sea must remain reliable and accessible to all vessels. The militarisation of international waterways also creates environmental dangers. Attacks on oil tankers and vessels carrying hazardous materials can cause serious pollution. The sinking of cargo ships threatens marine ecosystems, fisheries and coastal livelihoods. Longer shipping routes further increase fuel consumption and emissions. Thus, the consequences of maritime conflicts extend from commercial trade and labour rights to the environmental security of coastal communities.

The Forgotten Human Dimension

International discussions of maritime security frequently concentrate on oil prices, freight rates, insurance premiums and the strategic interests of major powers. The human consequences receive much less attention. The suffering of seafarers rarely attracts the international concern associated with other categories of civilian victims of war. Their isolation at sea, the multinational character of their employment and the commercial interests surrounding shipping contribute to this neglect.

The present crisis calls for a different approach. Protecting commercial navigation should begin with protecting the people who operate commercial vessels. Governments, shipping companies and international organisations must ensure that seafarers receive timely information about security threats, effective evacuation assistance, medical support and access to their families. Their right to refuse assignments in designated warlike or high-risk areas must be respected in accordance with applicable agreements. Compensation and insurance arrangements should provide meaningful protection when workers suffer injury, detention or death. There is also an urgent need for stronger international coordination to secure humanitarian evacuation corridors and prevent civilian crews from becoming instruments of military pressure.

Finally, the crisis reveals a major contradiction in the international maritime order. Global commerce depends on the freedom of the seas, but the protection of those who sustain that commerce remains inadequate. International law contains provisions intended to safeguard navigation and civilian lives, but political and military interests frequently override these obligations.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed this contradiction with disturbing clarity. The oceans cannot remain secure merely through the deployment of additional warships. Their security depends equally on diplomacy, restraint, respect for international law and recognition of the rights of those who work at sea.

For the thousands of seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf and other conflict zones, these are immediate questions of survival. Their predicament should remind the international community that maritime security is ultimately about human security. The freedom of navigation loses much of its meaning when those responsible for keeping the world’s trade moving are denied the basic freedom to return home safely.



About K.M. Seethi
K.M. Seethi is Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU), Kerala. He also served as ICSSR Senior Fellow, Senior Professor of International Relations and Dean of Social Sciences at MGU. One of his latest works is "ENDURING DILEMMA Flashpoints in Kashmir and India-Pakistan Relations."
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Nearly Three Decades Of ASEAN Haze Diplomacy, And The Smoke Still Returns – Analysis


Haze in Singapore. File Photo by Wolcott, Wikipedia Commons.


October 24, 2026

By Collins Chong Yew Keat

Key Takeaways:

The article argues that ASEAN’s longstanding frameworks on transboundary haze, including the 2002 Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and successive roadmaps, have produced little practical impact despite repeated large-scale fires, such as the 1997–98 and 2015 events that burned millions of hectares and caused multi-billion-dollar losses.

It attributes the persistent failures to economic incentives for land clearing, weak local enforcement, ASEAN’s lack of sanctioning power, and the principle of non-interference that favors closed-door consensus over accountability.

The author concludes that ASEAN can serve only as a coordinator and technical supporter, and that lasting prevention requires member governments to enforce domestic laws, share transparent data, strengthen corporate accountability, and prioritize peatland and forest management.


Every few years the same grey settles over the region, and almost identical script is repeated, where concerns are raised and actions are promised, but impact has been scarce. When domestic or bilateral actions are limited, ASEAN is seen as the convenient platform to be seen where at least efforts are made to address the long held conundrum.

But this risks the mechanism being used as a feel good factor, without the real structural and systemic changes and solutions needed. ASEAN has failed on the issue of haze, but other pressing and long held crises have also faced the same roadblock and impasse by the structural limitations of ASEAN.

Slowly, it has become a convenient and safe platform that lets governments show something is being done, but true efficacy has been limited.The central problem in Jakarta is the gap between political commitment, emergency action and real enforcement capacity.

The bigger question is how and why fires of this scale keep returning when the risks have been identified.In 1997–98, nearly 100,000 square kilometres burned, with losses estimated at about US$9 billion. The next big one was in 2015, where 2.6 million hectares burned at a cost of US$16.1 billion.

This year, Reuters has called this as Indonesia’s most intense El Niño-fuelled fire season in more than a decade.

The underlying causes have repeatedly been identified as clearing land by burning, the poor management of peatland, the economic interests of plantations, and weak oversight and enforcement at the local level. While El Niño did worsen the situation, it cannot be singled out as the sole convenient reason to set aside human and institutional responsibility.

As long as the priority is confined to emergency response rather than structural reform and prevention, the problem will persist.

Frameworks without implementation


ASEAN has been creating frameworks for cooperation, including the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution signed in 2002 and the haze-free roadmap for 2016–2020 and a second plan for 2023–2030. However, impact has been almost non-existent, and it looks better on paper than on the ground.


A three-pronged structural weakness explains this. First, the root causes of the haze are rooted in economic structures and land use, with large commercial interests at stake. Second, the capacity and the will to enforce laws differ between the central government, local administrations and enforcement agencies. Third, ASEAN itself has no enforcement power to penalise or to enforce the rules.

The Agreement has real diplomatic, political and institutional value but almost non-existent enforcement capacity, with no dedicated enforcement court and no power to sanction a member.

Hence, an agreement without clear accountability and consequences will risk being seen as a mere symbol of commitment, and it has been resting heavily on the will of the members to act.

The principle of non-interference further compelled this. The culture of consensus and the reluctance to cause diplomatic tension have pushed ASEAN to lean toward closed-door negotiation rather than open pressure.

The strategic dilemma is to keep harmony between governments or to apply more effective pressure for regional public health. ASEAN is not a supranational body that can act on members, and remains too focused on preserving government-to-government relations, where accountability too often is neglected.

The most effective pressure would be a combination of both preventive actions at the ground level, and to combine firmer bilateral diplomacy, transparent data, and the use of domestic legal instruments.

Acknowledge Shortcomings


What ASEAN must avoid is to become a comfortable diplomatic channel for soothing public criticism without any change in policy or effective enforcement.


ASEAN must first acknowledge the limits of its existing mechanisms and the structural ingrained limitations.

A four-pronged mechanism must then be in place. First, to strengthen transparent and accurate data sharing, including concession maps, ownership information and hotspot data. Second, to shape faster emergency protocols with clear response-time targets for exchanging information and considering assistance. Third, enhance corporate accountability and domestic enforcement through joint investigations. Fourth, to make peatland and forest management the main long-term priority for prevention. Fifth, to restructure the whole concept of commercial interest and the practice of slash and burn through both educational and enforcement led prevention measures both at the ground level and at the highest commercial accountability and deterrence, with costs involved.

ASEAN cannot be the only answer to this crisis, as its structure and mandate do not allow it to become an effective and capable long term regional enforcement body. Ultimate responsibility must eventually return to member governments and their domestic legal frameworks. ASEAN can function as a coordinator and provider of technical support, but it cannot substitute for national responsibility.


About Collins Chong Yew Keat
Collins Chong Yew Keat has been serving in University of Malaya, the top university in Malaysia for more than 9 years. His areas of interests include strategic and security studies, American foreign policy and power analysis and has published various publications on numerous platforms including books and chapter articles. He is also a regular contributor in providing op-eds for both the local and international media on various contemporary global issues and regional affairs since 2007.
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Tech executives back student-led list in Serbia election

Tech executives back student-led list in Serbia election
Serbian business leaders say rule of law is key to growth / studenti.org.rsFacebook
By Tatyana Kekic in Belgrade October 23, 2026

More than 170 Serbian business leaders and tech executives have signed an open letter backing a student-led electoral list ahead of the October 25 parliamentary election.

The signatories include Branko Milutinovic, co-founder of video game developer Nordeus, Dragan Tomic, the vice president of engineering at US data analytics company Databricks and executives from technology companies AMD and Cisco.

The letter, titled "We believe in a Serbia that can do much more", expresses support for the Student List, which is challenging the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of long-standing ruler Aleksandar Vucic in the October 25 election.

The signatories praised the students for their solidarity, responsibility and perseverance, saying their demands for functioning state institutions were essential to economic development.

It argued that the rule of law, reliable institutions, education and responsible management of public finances were necessary to attract investment, create better-paid jobs and secure pensions.

The signatories said legal certainty and courts that resolve disputes fairly would encourage companies to invest, hire workers and plan for the long term. They also highlighted the importance of cooperation between universities and businesses in improving productivity and helping companies enter new markets.

Among the other signatories are Ivan Stojisavljevic, Nordeus co-founder and Take-Two Interactive vice president; Marija Ilic, co-founder of video game studio Two Desperados and president of the Serbian Gaming Association's board; and Igor Bogicevic, co-founder of biotechnology startup Seven Bridges and HR analytics company Orgnostic.

The list also includes Dusan Komar and Laszlo Horvath, co-founders of Ominimo, which announced in July that it had reached a valuation of $1.6bn, becoming Serbia's first unicorn company as a startup valued at more than $1bn.

Other signatories include Nikola Mrksic, co-founder and chief executive of artificial intelligence company PolyAI, and Aleksandar Kuzmanovic, a computer science professor at Northwestern University and co-founder of bloXroute Labs.

The signatories said they were expressing support in their personal capacities and called on other businesspeople and entrepreneurs to join them.

"We support the Student List, number 3, and we will vote for it on Sunday," the letter said, adding that the students needed an opportunity to put their proposals into practice.

The student movement emerged from anti-government protests that followed the collapse of a railway station canopy in the northern city of Novi Sad in November 2024, a disaster that killed 16 people and fuelled public anger over alleged corruption and accountability.

The election is being held more than a year ahead of schedule amid sustained protests and growing political pressure on Vucic and the SNS, which has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade.

 

Central and Southeast Europe outstrip EU's post-pandemic growth

Central and Southeast Europe outstrip EU's post-pandemic growth
Romania's capital region grew by a third between 2019 and 2024, faster than any EU region outside Ireland, while three of the EU's five worst-performing regions were in Romania and Bulgaria, Eurostat data show. / EurostatFacebook
By IntelliNews October 23, 2026

Most eastern EU members outgrew the bloc as a whole between 2019 and 2024, led by Croatia, Bulgaria and Poland, while Romania's capital region recorded the fastest growth outside Ireland, Eurostat data showed on October 22.

GDP across the EU rose by 5.6% in real terms over the period, compared with increases of 19.3% in Croatia, 14.3% in Bulgaria, 13.8% in Poland and 13.2% in Lithuania. Growth was unevenly distributed within several countries, with capital regions often outperforming the rest of the economy.

The Romanian capital region of Bucuresti-Ilfov expanded by 33.0%, faster than any EU region outside Ireland. At the other end of the table, three of the five regions where economic activity fell most were in Romania and Bulgaria. GDP in Bulgaria's southeastern Yugoiztochen region contracted by 20.5%, the largest decline in the bloc, while Romania's Sud-Muntenia and Sud-Vest Oltenia shrank by 13.5% and 11.3%, respectively.

Change in real GDP of the eastern EU member states and the EU27, 2019-2024. Source: Eurostat regional accounts.

Romania provides the starkest example of regional divergence. Bucuresti-Ilfov's 33.0% expansion compared with growth of 9.5% for the country as a whole. The western regions of Nord-Vest and Vest grew by 15.8% and 14.3%, but GDP in Sud-Est was 5.1% lower in 2024 than in 2019, while Nord-Est barely grew, at 0.4%. Romania's productivity has been catching up quickly, with GDP per employee reaching 87.2% of the EU average, but the gains remain concentrated around the capital.

Bulgaria showed a similar split. Its southern central Yuzhen tsentralen region grew by 25.3%, Severen tsentralen in the north by 22.9% and the Sofia region, Yugozapaden, by 21.8%, while Yugoiztochen, home to the Black Sea port of Burgas, recorded the steepest contraction in the EU.

Hungary's Pest region, which surrounds the capital, grew by 19.1% and Budapest by 11.9%, but GDP in four other regions was lower in 2024 than in 2019. The biggest decline was in Eszak-Magyarorszag in the northeast, down 4.3%. Hungary's economy as a whole grew by 6.6%, barely above the EU average, after years in which household consumption lagged the rest of the bloc.

Czechia, the second-weakest performer among the eastern members, recorded growth of just 2.7%. Its northwestern Severozapad region, a coal-mining area, saw GDP fall by 6.9%, while Moravskoslezsko, the industrial region around Ostrava, contracted by 1.2%. Prague grew by 4.4%. Estonia, classified by Eurostat as a single region, expanded by just 0.9% over the five years, while Latvia grew by 4.2%.

Poland's growth was more evenly distributed. Every region expanded, with increases ranging from 9.2% in Lodzkie to 17.7% in Pomorskie on the Baltic coast. The Warsaw capital region grew by 15.9%.

Croatia also recorded broad-based growth, led by Sjeverna Hrvatska in the north, up 25.9%, and the Adriatic region, which expanded by 19.7%. In Lithuania, the capital region around Vilnius grew by 19.0%, more than twice the 8.9% increase in the rest of the country. In Slovakia, the gap between the capital and the east was narrower, with Vychodne Slovensko growing by 9.4%, slightly faster than the Bratislava region at 9.0%.

Across the EU as a whole, 197 of the 244 regions with available data recorded higher economic activity in 2024 than in 2019, while GDP fell in 46. Almost all capital regions expanded, with Helsinki-Uusimaa in Finland the only exception. Ireland's three regions led the bloc, with Eastern and Midland recording growth of 38.0%.

 

Central Europe at the frontline of Europe's authoritarian populist surge

Central Europe at the frontline of Europe's authoritarian populist surge
Challenger parties take more than half the vote in four Central and Southeast European countries, and seven of the 10 European democracies where they are strongest are post-communist, according to the Authoritarian Populism Index 2026. / Image by Gerd Altmann from PixabayFacebook
By Clare Nuttall in Glasgow October 23, 2026

Populist, authoritarian and extremist parties secured more than half the vote in the latest parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, Czechia, Romania and Slovakia, while their combined support across Europe reached a record 32.6%, according to a report by Swedish think tank Timbro and the EPICENTER network published this week.

Italy is the only other country among the 31 European democracies covered where so-called challenger parties command a majority, and seven of the 10 countries where they are strongest are post-communist, the fifth edition of the Authoritarian Populism Index found. Challengers won more than 20% of the vote in 26 countries, with almost one in three European voters backing parties classified as populist, authoritarian or extremist — roughly three times the level seen for most of the post-war era.

The report, authored by Andreas Johansson Heinö, examines more than 260 parties using electoral data dating back to 1945 and includes a detailed analysis of 76 parties. It finds that the radical right is driving most of the increase, retaining support rather than fading after protest surges, while the radical left has edged up recently but remains well below its post-war strength. Social democrats have lost more than four in 10 voters since 2000, while Christian democrats have declined steadily since the 1970s. Liberal parties, by contrast, remain close to their record levels of support.

Challenger parties are also increasingly part of the political establishment. By summer 2026 they were represented in 11 of the 31 governments covered, although participation in power has produced different outcomes, moderating some parties, emboldening others and contributing to the collapse of coalitions elsewhere.

Central and Southeast Europe has supplied some of the clearest examples of the risks to liberal democracy. Of the 76 parties examined in depth, 18 are classified as highly authoritarian, including Hungary's Fidesz, Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) and Slovakia's Smer. These parties have "already demonstrated in government how far they are prepared to go in weakening judicial independence, constraining media pluralism, politicising state institutions or otherwise eroding liberal-democratic checks and balances", Johansson Heinö wrote.

Hungary also illustrates the limits of the model. Peter Magyar's newly founded centre-right Tisza won 53.2% of the party-list vote in the April election against 38.6% for Fidesz, securing 141 of 199 seats and ending Viktor Orban's 16 years in power. The report describes Fidesz as one of Europe's clearest examples of authoritarian populism developing within an electoral democracy, but notes that voters were able to remove it despite highly unequal conditions of competition. The radical-right Our Homeland Movement survived the realignment, winning 5.6% of the list vote.

In Czechia, Andrej Babis' ANO returned to power with 34.5% of the vote in 2025 and governs alongside the radical-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Motorists for Themselves. The coalition marks the first time the modern Czech radical right has entered national government.

The government has shifted policy towards a more sovereignty-oriented line, cutting defence spending and scaling back support for Ukraine. Its plan to replace the licence fee for public broadcasters with direct state funding has also drawn mass protests. However, the index rates ANO as less authoritarian than Fidesz or Smer.

Slovakia's government under Robert Fico has moved further towards an illiberal national-conservative position. Smer has evolved from a pragmatic left-populist party into one with "a conception of sovereignty resembling that promoted by Viktor Orban in Hungary", the report says. It points to Fico's decision to end official military aid to Ukraine and his repeated meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, most recently in Moscow in May.

Coalition partner Hlas has been pulled towards Smer, while the hard-right, pro-Russian Republika won 12.5% in the 2024 European Parliament election.

In Romania, George Simion's Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) has led the polls for much of the past two years. It is classified as highly authoritarian, as are the smaller S.O.S. Romania and the Party of Young People.

The index also counts the Social Democratic Party (PSD), which joined AUR in the no-confidence vote that brought down Ilie Bolojan's government in May, because of its populist and authoritarian traits. Simion has since threatened to move against President Nicusor Dan unless he calls a snap election.

Bulgaria presents a different type of challenger. Former president, now prime minister, Rumen Radev's Progressive Bulgaria, founded in March, won an outright majority in the 2026 parliamentary election after eight elections in four years. The report considers the party broadly mainstream on policy but populist in style, with a focus on corruption and oligarchic interests. Many observers compare Radev with Orban and Fico because of his calls for a more pragmatic relationship with Russia, a comparison he rejects. Radev's ally Iliana Yotova leads the race for the presidential election on October 25.

Poland's right has fragmented. Konfederacja has established itself as a substantial independent force, while Grzegorz Braun's Confederation of the Polish Crown now advocates leaving the EU. PiS suffered its biggest split in more than 20 years in July, when former prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki and dozens of supporters left to form the Rozwoj Plus group, which has around 40 MPs.

The report argues that Russia has become a new dividing line on the European right. Orban obstructed or delayed EU measures against Moscow while in office, while disagreements over Ukraine helped split Estonia's radical-right EKRE in 2024. Ties to US President Donald Trump's Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement have not delivered the electoral boost many expected, and Orban's defeat came despite almost unanimous backing from Europe's radical right.

The divide reflects a broader shift in the movement's priorities. Of the 76 parties examined in detail, 20 are classified as hard eurosceptic, making outright EU exit a minority position. Many now seek to reshape the bloc from within, redirecting cooperation towards migration control, border protection and national sovereignty.

The report's central concern remains the effect of these parties on democracy when they enter government, rather than their electoral success alone. Their records show that holding office can moderate some challengers but can also give others greater scope to weaken institutional checks and balances.


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Pakistan’s job drought leaves millions high and dry

Pakistan’s job drought leaves millions high and dry
/ Hassaan Malik - UnsplashFacebooTwitter


By IntelliNews - Mumbai bureau October 23, 2026

Pakistan is facing a major employment crisis. According to the latest Economic Survey 2025-26, the working-age population in the country increased from 159.8mn to 179.6mn, reflecting Pakistan’s expanding labour supply.

The employed labour force also rose from 67.25mn to 77.2mn, indicating an increase in employment opportunities during the period. At much the same time, the number of those without jobs also increased, from a low of 4.51mn to a high of 5.9mn - the unemployment rate rising from 6.3% to 7.1%, in the process highlighting the need to further accelerate job creation in line with labour force growth.

The unemployment rate of 7.1% is the highest in over two decades in Pakistan. The report further stated that poverty increased from 22% in FY2019 to an 11-year high of 29% in FY2026 and income inequality hit a 27-year high as real incomes and household consumption declined over the past seven years.

The extent of the crisis was highlighted in a report filed by Arab News in July this year. The newspaper highlighted cases such as that of one Maria Ismail, a female journalist who has been searching for a job after losing the one she had for years. She said she has been surviving on her savings like millions of other Pakistanis, uncertain how much longer they will last.

According to the report, Pakistan’s Finance Adviser Khurram Schehzad did not entertain Arab News’ requests for comment on growing unemployment in the country, Pakistan's Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb in June having stated that the government had been able to achieve a “broad-based” economic rebound in FY2026 despite the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

Ubaidullah Shareef, a member of the Salaried Class Alliance of Pakistan (SCAP) advocacy group, instead told Arab News that a limited industrial expansion and the departure of multinational companies had constrained employment opportunities in the country.

In an interview with Reuters earlier this year, World Bank President Ajay Banga said that Pakistan must create up to 30mn jobs over the next decade to turn its youth bulge into an economic dividend, or risk instability and outward migration - the proverbial 'brain drain' many countries in Asia have seen over the past decade.

Pakistan needs to generate 2.5mn to 3mn jobs a year, roughly 25 to 30mn over the next decade, as millions of young people come of age, Banga said. Failure to do so may result in illegal migration or internal instability.

Pakistan's job strategy rests on three pillars, Banga continued: investment in human and physical infrastructure, business-friendly regulatory reforms, and expanded access to financing and insurance, particularly for small firms and farmers that typically lack bank credit. Infrastructure, primary healthcare, tourism and small-scale agriculture are labour-intensive sectors with the greatest employment potential, he said, adding that farming alone could account for about one-third of the jobs Pakistan needs to create over the next 25 years.

Align skills development with labour market demand

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) on July 27 called on Pakistan to overhaul its skills training system to better meet employers’ needs as digitalisation, artificial intelligence (AI) and climate change reshape the world of work.

In a note following a high-level roundtable in Lahore marking World Youth Skills Day, the ILO highlighted the challenge of integrating young people into the workforce, with 28.4% of the country's youth neither employed nor in education or training.

Pakistan has an estimated 46.3mn people aged 15–24, of whom 20.6mn participate in the labour force, according to the Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2024–25. Of these, 2.6mn are unemployed, putting the youth unemployment rate at 12.8%, nearly twice the overall rate of 7.1%.

While the proportion of young people not in employment, education or training has dropped from 32.5% in 2020–21, it remains at an elevated level at 28.4%, leading to a quarter of the youth population without work or access to education and training.

The survey states that 4.9mn young people aged 15–24 have received technical or vocational training, including 3mn men and 1.9mn women. The figures point to the need to expand access to training, particularly for young women, while improving the transition from skills acquisition to sustained employment.

According to Geir Tonstol, director of the ILO Country Office for Pakistan, “Pakistan needs a training ecosystem that keeps pace with industry, supports innovation and prepares young people for jobs that are emerging today, not yesterday. Strengthening collaboration between government, industry and development partners is essential to ensure that skills investments translate into higher employability, greater productivity and stronger economic growth.”

One of the most important highlights that came out of the discussion was the need for better coordination and cooperation between employment generators and institutions that offer training. There is also a requirement for greater dependence on data pertaining to the labour market and more focused investment in skills training for sectors with the potential to create productive jobs, they said.

Participants also stressed increased investment in lifelong learning to help workers refresh their skills as technologies and employer needs change.

“Skills development must respond not only to AI, digitalisation and the green transition, but also to the structural constraints that affect enterprises and workers alike,” said Ahmed Khan, chief executive officer of the Punjab Skills Development Fund (PSDF).

“Productivity, innovation and decent work must be at the centre of the national skills agenda. When productivity rises, enterprises become more competitive, workers can earn better wages and economies grow more sustainably,” he said.