Iron Law of Oligarchy by Robert Michels

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In this article we will discuss about the iron law of oligarchy by Robert Michels.

The Italian sociologist Robert Michels (1876-1936) published in 1911 a book entitled Political Parties. This is a study of European socialist parties and trade unions with particular reference to the German Socialist Party.

These organisations were ostensibly anti-capitalist and pro-socialist in their aims. Their activities were directed towards abolition of capitalism and establishment of socialist societies in their respective countries.

These organisations also claimed to be democratic inasmuch as they represented the interests and wishes of their members. In this book Michels analysed the activities, and in particular the ways in which these organisations functioned, and concluded that democratic ideals bore little resemblance to the actual situation. Michels begins his analysis with reference to a paradox.

In large-sized and populous nation-states of today, the masses of people are completely helpless in making their wishes felt at the centre of power till they are able to organise themselves. According to Michels, therefore, organisation is essential to democracy. The masses cannot participate directly in the decision-making process for obvious difficulties.

Numbers stand in the way. What is possible for one or the few is not possible for the ‘many’, particularly when ‘many’ means hundreds, thousands or hundreds of thousands.

The only way out is to adopt the representative system whereby ‘delegates represent the mass and carry out its will’. Theoretically, this system meets the demands of democracy. Michels, however, argues that, in practice, the picture is entirely different.

Organisation, which is indispensable for ensuring the participation of the masses in the democratic process, sounds the death knell of democracy. Power tends to be concentrated in the hands of those who are at the helm of affairs of the organisation.

This is a paradox and a tragedy which constitute the theme of Michel’s book. Michels gives us a step-by-step analysis of the way in which an oligrachy actually monopolises power under the facade of a democratic set-up.

In the early stages of the development of an organisation, the various functions and positions are all equal in the sense that “differential amounts of wealth or power are not associated with the various positions”. The social honour which is accorded to the head of the organisation and other t6p functionaries does not enable them to transform that honour into special perquisites and privileges.

In Michels’ words:

“Originally, the chief is merely the servant of the mass”.

The democratic and equalitarian character of the organisation is assured, in the early stages, by the strong commitment of its members to the principles of democracy and equality. “Functions are rotated, delegates and representatives are totally subject to the will of the collectivity, and in general a high degree of camaraderie prevails”.

This state of affairs is possible as long as:

(i) The organisation is relatively small in size and

(ii) Functions of the organisation do not call for specialised knowledge and skill.

Things begin to change, however, when the growing scale of the organisation leads to complex division of labour,’ so much so that certain tasks and duties require training, skill of a special kind, and a considerable amount of expert knowledge. Expertise becomes a ‘foot in the door’.

“The experts increasingly resemble not servants but masters and the organisation becomes increasingly hierarchical and bureaucratic”, with the growing scale of the organisation, administrative duties and tasks proliferate, with the result that “it is no longer possible to take them in at a glance”.

In course of time, these tasks and duties become incomprehensible to those who do not possess expert knowledge.

“Faced with this complexity, rank and file members of trade unions and political parties tend to leave matters to their leaders. Decisions are increasingly taken by executive committees within the bureaucracy rather than by assemblies of the rank and file. Thus the very organisation which was created to represent its members ends up by largely excluding them from participation and decision-making”.

There is another parallel development. The men who were originally appointed to serve the interests of the collectivity soon develop interests of their own which are often opposed to that of collectivity. Michels, therefore, concludes that organisations, which are set up to preserve democracy, inevitably produce oligarchy, that is, rule by small elite. This is the ‘iron law of oligarchy’.

Given the oligarchical nature of bureaucratic structures, may not the interest of the rank and file be attended to? Michels is very pessimistic. He argues that those, who enjoy various perquisites and privileges by virtue of their occupying certain positions in the organisation, gradually develop vested interests of their own. Naturally, such vested interests take priority over the stated goals of the organisation.

This clearly involves a displacement of organisational goals whereby preservation of the organisation becomes an end in itself rather than a means to an end. The leaders of the organisation naturally refrain from doing anything which may eventually endanger their own positions, even though realisation of organisational, goals demands such actions.

Leaders are able to maintain power for a variety of reasons of which three are important. In the first place, the leaders harp on ‘experience’, ‘expertise’ and ‘indispensability’ in order to legitimize their positions of power. They assiduously create an impression among the rank and file that the organisation would suffer if they cease to be at the helm of affairs of the company.

Second, the rank and file is apathetic, they are actually quite content to have others attend to their affairs, and their indifference is evident from the slackness of attendance at ordinary meetings. Third, the masses are incompetent Michels characterizes this frailty as “perennial incompetence of the masses”.

According to Michels the weakest link in the Marxian view of the new socialist society is the problem of administration. In large organisations, there will necessarily be concentration of power in the hands of a few. Human nature being what, it is, this small minority would, in course of time, develop interests of their own which may be in conflict with those of the collectivity.

Moreover, they would try by all means to retain their privileges. Michels, therefore, concludes that conflicts of interests emerge between leaders and led, not unlike the class conflicts of old society. This process is characterised by Michels as an absolute social law.

He says:

“By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the new for the division of labour, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself. The existence of these special interests involves a necessary conflict with the interests of the collectivity. Nay, more, social strata fulfilling peculiar functions tend to become isolated, to produce organs fitted for the defense of their own peculiar interests. In the long run they tend to undergo transformation into distinct classes”.

Michels, it should be particularly borne in mind, does not intend this as a refutation of Marxian theory of class struggle, but of his vision of a classless society. He made a very significant comment long before a single socialist regime had taken power anywhere: The socialists might conquer, but not socialism, which would perish in the moment of its adherents’ ‘triumph’.

Zeitlin observes in this context that “the victory of the bureaucratic organisation over the socialist soul, had already become evident in the violation of a fundamental socialist principle: international solidarity”.

The views of Robert Michels, particularly his views about the Iron Law of Oligarchy as an absolute social law, have been criticised from different points of view. To begin with, the suggestion that the iron law of oligarchy will inevitably operate in all large sized organisations is not acceptable.

Various cross-cultural and even intra-cultural studies of political parties indicate that the internal organisations of political parties do not exhibit a uniform pattern and that oligarchical rule may develop in some while in some others it may not.

S.M. Lipset says that the internal organisational structures of the Democratic and Republican parties are decentralised, so much so that there is no central leadership in either of the parties which can dictate and impose its views on party members.

The party members at the local level exercise considerable influence and power. But no oligarchical rule at the local level can develop, for the simple reason that the members themselves are divided into various factions.

Secondly, Michels’ treatment of the subject has been one-sided. He emphasised only the possibilities of misuse of power, and not have a word to say about the efforts made by party bosses to realise the goals of the organisation. This they needs must do in their own interest.

The accumulated grievances of the members of the organisation may eventually endanger the position of the party bosses. Possibilities of revolt among the rank and file may act as a brake upon them to misuse power beyond a certain limit and ignore the wishes of rank and file.

Thirdly, in all democratic organisations, commitment to democratic ideals and norms is, more or less, all-pervasive among the members. In such a situation, party bosses cannot act undemocratically with immunity. There are pockets of resistance at all levels of the democratic organisations to the attempts of party bosses to utilise power solely in furtherance of their selfish interests.

In the words of Talcott Parsons, power is only one of several cognate factors in the determination of social events”. As pointed out by Lipset, rivalry among party bosses themselves may serve as a check to abuse of power and consequent subversion of the goals of the organisation.