Sunday, November 22, 2026


What Is Happening To ASEAN? The Indo-Pacific’s Geo-Economic Battleground – Analysis





Key Takeaways:

Concurrent Russian warship visits, ASEAN finance-minister talks with the IMF and World Bank, and deepened ASEAN+3 economic ties illustrate Southeast Asia’s growing role as a contested geo-economic meeting point rather than a coordinated agenda.

ASEAN’s maritime geography and rising FDI inflows (US$226 billion in 2024) attract major powers seeking market access, supply-chain control, and technological influence, yet limited value capture and fragmented hedging leave the region vulnerable to asymmetric interdependence.

Converting this attention into collective advantage requires deeper market integration, investment policies that mandate technology transfer and local linkages, and coordinated resilience in energy, food, and digital infrastructure so ASEAN can set the terms of engagement.



Something interesting is unfolding in Southeast Asia. In early October 2026, Russian Pacific Fleet warships visited Jakarta before continuing their journey to Malaysia. At almost the same time, ASEAN finance ministers met with the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Bangkok. Earlier, ASEAN had also deepened economic cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea. Are these events merely diplomatic activities that happen to have occurred close together, or do they reflect a changing position of ASEAN in the competition among global powers?

There is no evidence that all these events form a coordinated agenda. However, viewed through a geo-economic lens, a strategic pattern cannot be ignored: ASEAN is increasingly becoming a meeting point for the interests of major powers in trade, investment, technology, financing, energy and security. The issue is not simply why the world is interested in ASEAN, but who will gain the greatest strategic advantage from this growing engagement.

From Military Competition to the Contest for Economic Influence

The visit of three Russian Pacific Fleet warships to Jakarta from 30 September to 4 October 2026 was officially described as a friendship mission and an opportunity for professional exchanges. The visit therefore cannot be interpreted directly as the formation of a new military alliance. However, defence diplomacy remains one of the instruments for maintaining strategic relations and creating space for broader cooperation.


Meanwhile, on 13 October 2026, ASEAN finance ministers held a dialogue with World Bank President Ajay Banga in Bangkok. The discussions covered private capital mobilisation, infrastructure, artificial intelligence (AI), digital transformation, energy and job creation. The IMF also projects ASEAN growth of 4.9 per cent in 2026 and 4.7 per cent in 2027. On the trade front, ASEAN Plus Three (together with China, Japan and South Korea) recorded two-way trade of US$1.4 trillion in 2025. Foreign direct investment from the three partners into ASEAN reached US$44.8 billion.

These facts show that interest in ASEAN is moving through different channels. Russia is present through defence diplomacy; China, Japan and South Korea through trade and investment; while the IMF and World Bank operate through macroeconomic stability and development financing. This does not mean that all these actors share the same objectives. On the contrary, it is precisely the divergence of their interests that makes ASEAN increasingly strategic.

When Economic Instruments Become Sources of Power

Edward Luttwak, through the concept of geoeconomics, explains how competition among states is increasingly pursued through economic instruments. In this competition, tariffs, investment, financing, technology, market access and control over supply chains can function as sources of strategic influence.


From this perspective, ASEAN is not simply a region offering business opportunities. It is also an arena in which major powers seek to maintain market access, create economic dependencies, secure supplies of raw materials and expand technological influence. China has an interest in maintaining its trade and production networks in Southeast Asia. The United States has interests in Indo-Pacific security, strategic technologies and supply-chain diversification. Japan and South Korea have interests in production stability, energy and market access. Russia seeks to maintain strategic relations with countries in the region.

This is where geo-economic competition takes place – not always through direct confrontation, but through competition for infrastructure contracts, factory locations, export markets, energy resources, technology standards and strategic partnerships.

The framework of weaponised interdependence developed by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman deepens this analysis. In global economic networks, interdependence is not necessarily symmetrical. States that control critical nodes in financial, technological or supply networks can use these positions to influence other states.

ASEAN faces a dilemma. Connectivity with multiple powers expands opportunities for investment and trade, but it also creates vulnerabilities when access to technology, financing or markets is used as a source of pressure. The greater the economic integration, the more important it becomes to manage the risks of dependency.


Why Does the Indo-Pacific Position Make ASEAN Contested?


ASEAN’s advantage lies not only in its population or the size of its market. Its geographic location connects the Indian and Pacific oceans, while the Strait of Malacca and surrounding sea lanes form an important part of global trade and energy flows.

Under these circumstances, stability in Southeast Asia has consequences beyond the region. Disruptions to shipping lanes, tensions in the South China Sea or fragmentation of supply chains could increase trade costs, disrupt energy supplies and alter investment decisions.

Therefore, the competition for influence in ASEAN is directly linked to the economic configuration of the Indo-Pacific. Countries with strong trade relations, infrastructure access and technology partnerships in the region gain strategic positions within the regional economic network. However, geography alone does not guarantee power. A strategic position produces bargaining power only when ASEAN countries can transform their locational advantages into industrial, technological and institutional capacity.

ASEAN is indeed becoming increasingly attractive to global capital. The ASEAN Investment Report records that FDI flows into the region reached US$226 billion in 2024, an 8 per cent increase while global investment weakened. However, large investment flows do not automatically mean that ASEAN captures the largest share of value added. Differences in economic structures among members, technological capabilities, workforce quality and domestic supplier linkages determine the extent to which investment generates productivity and national income.


This is where the concept of hedging becomes relevant. ASEAN countries seek to maintain relations with multiple powers without becoming fully dependent on any single one. This strategy can expand economic options and reduce geopolitical risks. However, if each country pursues its own strategy without coordination, ASEAN could instead become divided by competition to attract investment and external support.

In other words, the region can become both an economic magnet and a battleground. Both possibilities can exist at the same time. The decisive question is whether ASEAN can manage this competition in pursuit of its collective interests.

To achieve this, several strategic steps could be taken by ASEAN.

First, ASEAN needs to strengthen market integration, reduce cross-border trade barriers and improve logistical connectivity. A more integrated regional market would increase bargaining power compared with a situation in which each country negotiates separately.

Second, investment policy should be oriented towards technology transfer, local supplier development, skills upgrading and the creation of higher-value jobs. The measure of success should not be limited to the value of investment entering the region, but should also include the ability of domestic industries to move up the value chain.

Third, ASEAN needs to strengthen resilience in energy, food, financing and digital infrastructure. Diversifying partners is important, but diversification must be accompanied by domestic capacity so that it does not merely replace one form of dependency with another.

Fourth, ASEAN centrality needs to be translated into practical coordination. Cooperation with China, the United States, Russia, Japan, the IMF and the World Bank should be assessed according to its benefits, risks, transparency and contribution to the region’s long-term interests.

The growing global attention to ASEAN is therefore not only an economic opportunity but also a strategic test. The region possesses important geographic advantages, markets and production networks. Yet these advantages can become either sources of bargaining power or sources of vulnerability. The real question is not whether ASEAN is being contested by global powers. The more important question is whether ASEAN can determine the terms of their engagement.

If it succeeds, ASEAN can turn global competition into investment, technology and productivity. If it fails, the region risks becoming a place where different powers pursue their own interests while ASEAN countries capture only part of the benefits. In the era of geoeconomics, power is determined not only by who comes to ASEAN, but also by who controls the networks, creates value added and shapes the rules of the game.


About Dr. Eko Setiobudi
Dr. Eko Setiobudi, SE, ME, is an economist, lecturer at STIES Mitra Karya Bekasi, Indonesia, and business practitioner. His areas of interest include macroeconomics, fiscal policy, international trade, financial markets, economic development, and global economic affairs. He writes analytical commentaries on Indonesia, ASEAN, Asia, and the evolving global economic order.
View all posts by Dr. Eko Setiobudi →

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