Sunday, November 22, 2026

French court finds racism played role in police beating of black music producer

A French court has handed down prison sentences to three police officers for the violent assault of black music producer Michel Zecler in Paris in 2020, ruling that racism was an aggravating factor in a case that sparked nationwide outrage over police brutality and racial discrimination.



Issued on: 21/11/2026 - RFI

French music producer Michel Zecler is surrounded by journalists as he leaves the courtroom after the hearing on the final day of the trial of three police officers accused of beating him in 2020, at the Paris criminal court in Paris, France, 20 November 2026. REUTERS - Benoit Tessier

The three officers were convicted on Friday over the beating of Zecler, now 47, who was attacked at the entrance to his Paris recording studio during France's Covid-19 lockdown in November 2020.

The assault, captured on security cameras, sparked widespread condemnation after footage emerged showing officers repeatedly punching and kicking him.

The court sentenced Aurélien Lapersonne, 29, to five years in prison, including three years suspended, while Philippe Tondeux, 50, received five years, with three-and-a-half years suspended.

A third officer, Pierre Plantier, 37, received five years, including four suspended. He will serve the remaining year under electronic surveillance rather than in prison.

Lapersonne and Tondeux will begin serving their custodial sentences at a later date.

Supporters applauded as Zecler emerged from the courtroom.

"Justice has been done. It has restored a man's dignity and allowed him to begin rebuilding himself," his lawyer, Serge Money, said.

All three officers had apologised earlier in the day, with Plantier breaking down in tears. Tondeux expressed regret over the damage caused to the police force's reputation.


Security footage challenges police account

The incident took place on 21 November 2020, when officers stopped Zecler outside his studio for allegedly failing to wear a mandatory face mask.

Investigators established that they pushed him into the entrance before assaulting him, leaving him with head trauma, injuries to his lip and scalp, and a ruptured biceps tendon.

The officers initially claimed Zecler had attacked them and attempted to seize a firearm, but security footage contradicted their account.

They were subsequently prosecuted for assault and falsifying their police report.

Zecler also maintained that the officers repeatedly directed racist insults at him – an allegation central to the court's ruling.

Although prosecutors had sought prison sentences of four to six years, the judges imposed lighter penalties while recognising racism as an aggravating circumstance, contrary to the investigators' assessment.

They cited the consistency of Zecler's testimony, noting that he had reported racist insults immediately after the beating, at the police station, during his transfer to hospital and to relatives.

The court also found that the officers' falsified report undermined the credibility of their denials.

Wider debate over racial profiling

The verdict comes amid continuing debate over police violence and racial profiling in France, where convictions in high-profile brutality cases remain relatively rare.

Campaigners and researchers argue that excessive force and discriminatory policing reflect systemic problems, while authorities and police unions generally maintain that misconduct involves a minority of officers.

The Zecler case became a focal point of that debate after the footage circulated widely in 2020, prompting demonstrations and renewed demands for police accountability.

In another closely watched case, three officers received suspended prison sentences in 2024 over the violent arrest of Théo Luhaka, a young black man who suffered irreversible rectal injuries during a stop-and-search operation near Paris in 2017.

Research by France's independent human rights watchdog, the Défenseur des droits, has also highlighted persistent racial disparities in policing.

A 2025 report, based on a survey of more than 5,000 people, found that young men perceived as Arab, black or North African were four times more likely to be stopped by police than the rest of the population.

They were also 12 times more likely to face more intrusive measures, including being frisked.

Friday's ruling marks a significant development in Zecler's six-year legal battle, particularly through the court's recognition of racism as an aggravating factor in the assault.
Students and unions unite for sixth weekend of protests across France

Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets across France on Saturday for a sixth consecutive weekend of protests against rising living costs, deteriorating public services and growing inequality. The movement, which began with student demonstrations in September, has since broadened into a nationwide campaign and inspired similar rallies elsewhere in Europe.



Issued on: 21/11/2026 - RFI

Musicians and members of the 'Orchestre Manifique' symphonic orchestra perform during a demonstration at Place de la Republique in Paris on 21 November 2026, as part of a nationwide day of protests over the rising cost of living and inequality organised by Yellow Vest movement, labour unions and high school and university students. AFP - GUILLAUME SALIGOT

Thousands of people gathered in cities across France on Saturday as a wave of protests over the cost of living, public services and police conduct entered its sixth consecutive weekend, bringing together students, trade unions and political activists.

In Paris, several thousand demonstrators converged on Place de la République, where musicians, food trucks and colourful costumes created a festive atmosphere despite the increasingly serious political grievances driving the movement.

Trade union banners and flags representing left-wing political parties mingled with those of student organisations and the Yellow Vest movement, which emerged eight years ago to challenge President Emmanuel Macron's government over fuel prices, taxation and declining purchasing power.

Some demonstrators carried homemade placards demanding greater investment in education, healthcare and social protection, while others highlighted what they described as the growing difficulty of making ends meet.

One sign summed up the frustration felt by many young protesters: "I want to live, not survive."

Another group erected mock gravestones symbolising the death of France's public services, including its education and social security systems.

The demonstrations come amid persistent concerns over economic insecurity, widening inequality and the ability of public institutions to meet the needs of ordinary citizens.

Student anger fuels wider movement

The protests began in mid-September when secondary school students mobilised to demand better learning conditions, more resources and improvements to the education system.

What started as a campaign focused largely on schools has since expanded into a broader movement against rising prices, inadequate public services and allegations of excessive police force.

University students, trade unions and political organisations have joined the demonstrations, helping to turn an initially youth-led mobilisation into a wider expression of public discontent.

Although participation has declined since the movement's early weeks, organisers have continued to bring demonstrators onto the streets, with Saturday's rallies highlighting the persistence of concerns over living standards.

For student representatives, the movement reflects difficulties shared by young people well beyond France's borders.

"In a number of countries, young people are going through the same thing, namely precarity. You have to choose between having a roof over your head, getting medical care, and being able to eat your fill," said Manon Moret, general secretary of the Unef student union.

The French demonstrations follow a series of rallies across Europe on Friday, when protesters gathered to challenge government policies on living costs, military spending and climate change.

While the demands vary between countries, many demonstrators have expressed similar frustrations over economic insecurity and what they see as political leaders' failure to address the concerns of younger generations.

Police legislation adds to tensions

Saturday's mobilisation also came a day after France's parliament adopted controversial legislation strengthening legal protections for police officers who use their firearms.

The measure, backed by the government and conservative lawmakers but strongly criticised by the left, has added a fresh source of tension to an already strained relationship between demonstrators and law enforcement.

In Paris, one protester carried a placard reading "No to the licence to kill", reflecting fears among opponents that the legislation could weaken police accountability.

The issue has become increasingly prominent since clashes between riot police and demonstrators during earlier rallies.

Although the protest movement has been largely peaceful, some gatherings last month descended into violence, with shops looted and buildings attacked or set alight.

Police have also faced accusations of excessive force, further fuelling criticism from student groups, civil liberties campaigners and opposition politicians.

Ahead of Saturday's demonstrations, Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez instructed regional prefects to remain "particularly vigilant regarding the groups most hostile to law enforcement", following the adoption of the new police legislation.

However, the Interior Ministry said the latest mobilisation had begun in a "generally calm" atmosphere, with turnout lower than at previous demonstrations.

The demonstrations also coincide with the eighth anniversary of the Yellow Vest movement, providing a reminder of how grievances over purchasing power and inequality have repeatedly fuelled social unrest in France.
Catalogue Of A Lost Stupa In Mirpurkhas, Sindh: Mumbai Museum Completes An Archaeo-Jigsaw Puzzle – Essay


Site view of the northwest face of the Kahu-jo-daro stupa, Mirpurkhas, Sindh, Pakistan. Photo-courtesy: Archaeological Survey of India


November 22, 2026

By Raju Mansukhani


Key Takeaways:

During the British royal visit to Mumbai in November 2026, CSMVS released a catalogue documenting 313 terracotta, architectural and sculptural relics from the 5th-century Kahu-jo-daro Buddhist stupa in present-day Sindh, Pakistan.

The publication reconstructs a stupa first systematically excavated by Sir Henry Cousens in 1909–10, showing how Greco-Roman Gandharan, Mathura and Kushana-Gupta styles fused into a distinctive Indo-Gandharan regional idiom.

CSMVS director Sabyasachi Mukherjee presents the catalogue as both a return to rigorous collection documentation and a demonstration that cultural heritage research can foster cross-border understanding and peace.


Reconstructed view of the stupa model. Photo-credit: CSMVS, Mumbai

Time has its own mysterious cycles. When His Royal Highness Prince William the Prince of Wales, and Her Royal Highness Princess Catherine Middleton were in Mumbai during their 16-18 November 2026 visit, it was marked by glamorous events, including street cricket with Sachin Tendulkar.

The Royal Couple could well have been reminded about challenging times of the past. On 11 November 1914, the visiting HRH Prince Edward the Prince of Wales had inaugurated a magnificent building in the southern tip of port-city of Bombay (now Mumbai) near the Gateway of India.


The building was rightfully named as the ‘Prince of Wales Museum of Western India’. Since these were years of wars and brutalities, the new Museum building was used as a military hospital. It was only on 10 January 1922 the Prince of Wales Museum was formally opened to public to witness the brilliance of objects of art, archaeology acquired by the Museum.

On 17 November 2026, the Museum, now hailed as Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (CSMVS) released a meticulously researched publication titled Kahu-jo-daro Buddhist Stupa – Catalogue of the Kahu-jo-daro terracotta, architectural and sculptural relics of the 5th century CE in the collection of CSMVS. It was as if Time had completed yet another cycle; words of the Chairman, Board of Trustees Mr. J.T. Brander in 1922 were ringing true. He stated the purpose of the Museum: “It should be largely an institution or foundation for promoting research in all branches of science and knowledge and not only a museum of curiosities for the sightseer.”

Said Dr Sabyasachi Mukherjee, the present director general of CSMVS at the helm for two decades, “In these last 100 years, our Museum has fulfilled its aim to create awareness and sensitivity towards our heritage through its acquisitions, collection research, a visitor-friendly experience for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment. Particularly, in the last decade, the Museum has been transformed into a world-class visitor space.” It has been a long and productive journey indeed for CSMVS and Kahu-jo-daro Buddhist Stupa Catalogue is a shining example of its academic brilliance, detailing 313 terracotta, architectural and sculptural relics. In many ways, it is like an archaeological jigsaw puzzle being completed.



Lost and found

In 1909 the ‘lost and found’ stupa story began with British archaeologist Sir Henry Cousens, who was the first to have excavated Kahu-jo-daro site. It was part of a larger Buddhist establishment, explained Mukherjee in the Catalogue introduction. “It is also one of the few surviving finest examples of terracotta art and architecture of the pre-Independence era, situated in one of the large mounds extending over 30 acres of land to the north of the present town of Mirpurkhas.” Today Mirphurkhas is the district headquarters of Thar and Parkar in the Sindh province of Pakistan.

Fifty years earlier General John Jacob, acting commissioner of Sindh, had noticed the dilapidated Buddha site but not realised its historical significance. Later in 1859, James Gibbs, another senior official, described the site as remains of a brick platform and even excavated the upper part of the mound. His diary entry recorded finding an earthenware pot filled with mud and pieces of amethyst and crystal; whereabouts of this pot or vase is unknown.

Sir John Woodburn, the collector of Hyderabad (Sindh) in 1894 contributed to the story as he accidentally rescued a large painted terracotta seated Buddha image, and the head of a second image, from railway contractors. As in case of Mohenjodaro, the largest of Harappan metropolises in Sindh, it was railway workers-contractors who were digging and using bricks for laying local railway tracks, having no idea of how old the bricks were nor its significance. To imagine that bricks, of uniform size and shape, survived two millennia and were now laying the foundation of a modern transport in early 20th century.


Site-map of the Kahu-jo-daro stupa, Mirpurkhas, Sindh, Pakistan. Photo-credit: CSMVS, Mumbai

Sir Henry Cousens, having begun excavations in 1909-1910 noted, that despite railway workers digging the bricks, there was so much of the stupa remaining at the north-end of the site. He remained true to his training as Surveyor and Superintendent at Archaeological Survey Department of India when he documented, catalogued, and surveyed the monuments in his charge across western India. N

ot only at Kahu-jo-daro but Ahmedabad, Champaner, Bijapur owe much to his perseverance and diligence. His book ‘The Antiquities of Sind with Historical Outline’ is regarded as a seminal work and provided a credible platform upon which the CSMVS built its research. The new Catalogue remains a heartfelt tribute to these magnificent men and their unbridled passion for the vast land they ruled.


Decorative brilliance

Originally Kahu-jo-daro stupa was decorated with 11 terracotta relief panels of seated Buddhas in the niches of the four faces of the platform. Each of the north, east and south faces had three large panels on either side of the entrance to the stupa from west side, it is explained. At the time of excavation only seven large images, and a small one, were found on site, it is reported. Kahu-jo-daro is probably the one site in the region that has yielded so many relief panels of Buddha images so far. The CSMVS team began digital reconstruction of the lost stupa, which as Mukherjee explained, is one of the few examples of decorative terracotta stupa architecture in the Indus Valley. Utilising the collection at CSMVS, and some surviving architectural fragments, the task began of imagining reconstructing the original shape of the stupa, built probably in 500 CE, even though Sir Cousens assigned the stupa to c 400 CE, a century earlier.

“One can easily imagine the magnificent scene around the stupa in valley of Kahu-jo-daro,” he said, adding, “the main stupa with its majestic harmika stood nearly 20 metres tall, its towering presence inspiring devotees and pilgrims approaching from over a long distance. Thousands of local devotees, and those from all over India, perhaps even other countries, must have throned here to pay their respects to the great soul whose corporeal remains were enshrined in the stupa.”

The main entrance was embellished with decorative bricks and a torana or gate, as seen in Sanchi too. For pilgrims the circumambulation or going round the stupa is a sacred ritual, followed in Hinduism and Jainism too. At Kahu-jo-daro the visual gallery of seated Buddhas, in niches of the platform walls before entering the stupa, was the source of piety, inspiration and austerity. Shrines inside the stupa would have contained images of the Buddha; it would seem these images were moved to another site, probably to ensure their safety from invasions before the entire stupa itself was covered in sand and left buried, forgotten for centuries. Kahu-jo-daro belonged to a much earlier era, it could have been a reconstruction of a ruined stupa erected under Emperor Asoka’s orders in the 3rd century BCE, as the 2022 publication of CSMVS ‘The Lost Stupa’ detailed.

For a globalized world

The well-researched publications of CSMVS on Kahu-jo-daro in Sindh not only deepen our understanding of art history, cultural history, religious inspiration but are indicative of how our ancestors lived, offered prayers, and celebrated their lives. In more ways than one, an ancient past has been reconstructed for the benefit of our globalized audiences who are witness to wars, terrorism, financial volatility and chaos. Buddhism in Sindh may sound puzzling; for far too long Buddhism was thought as growing, radiating, and becoming a major religion from the east: with its centres in today’s Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh; and later parts of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, with the movement to Tibet, Mongolia, China, and Sri Lanka giving Buddhism its global character.
Buddha in meditation, Kahu-jo-daro stupa, Mirpurkhas, Sindh, Pakistan, terracotta 5th century CE. Photo-credit: CSMVS, Mumbai

Now with the new Catalogue there is a roadmap taking us through crossroads of culture to Gandhara up in mountains and valleys of north-western Pakistan, Mathura along the Indo-Gangetic belt, Ajanta in the Deccan plateau and Rajgriha in the plains of Bihar contributed and influenced the art-forms discovered at Kahu-jo-daro in Sindh. Quite clearly the east was meeting the western shores of the sub-continent, and contributing resplendently to this spiritual-cultural burst.

For Sabyasachi Mukherjee, who helmed the research for two decades, to say it was an immensely difficult task would be an understatement as the project began without inscriptions or literary evidences. “Kahu-jo-daro was remote, and beyond our reach and my material resources were only those in the CSMVS collection,” he said, acknowledging the contribution of a line of venerable historians-art historians and curators like Dr Moti Chandra, Dr Kalpana Desai, Dr Devangana Desai, and Dr Pratapaditya Pal. Their collective knowledge and pioneering works gave the ‘lost stupa’ research its new direction, highlighting the riverine culture, urban centres, trading towns, besides significance of religious places where people prayed, contributed their earnings, keeping places of worship alive through centuries.


Documenting for posterity

Cyrus Guzder, chairman board of trustees of CSMVS, wrote: “Cataloguing antiquities was once a routine scholarly practice in the museums during the 1960s and 1970s. Over time, however the institution gradually shifted towards thematic or ‘highlights of the collection’ publications. In the process, the traditional and rigorous approach of documenting the entire collection for posterity was often sidelined, inadvertently limiting access for students and researchers. Publication of the new Catalogue makes a significant return to the traditional museum practice. It will be serving as a valuable resource for future research.”

Clearly one major area of research is highlighted in the Catalogue: the artistic traditions in the region which allowed different art forms from North-Western India to assimilate into the mainstream. In particular the Greco-Roman style of the Gandhara region and the indigenous style at Mathura (Northern India) metamorphosed into an Indianness which could be wisely termed as the Indo-Gandhara art tradition. “The different artistic elements from different geographical locations, as witnessed at Kahu-jo-daro, are enough indication that the artists of this region were more liberal and flexible in accepting various architectural principles, forms and designs from the Gandhara as well as Kushana-Gupta art tradition,” explained Mukherjee, pointing out it testifies to the free exchange of ideas, artistic forms and design elements across cultural frontiers. What clearly emerged was a distinctive regional idiom, embodying both continuity and innovation, the hallmark of our cultural heritage and history.

“In today’s time preservation of cultural heritage has to become a top priority for UNESCO, governments of different countries and civil society too,” said Sabyasachi Mukherjee, emphasizing, “I strongly believe that the power of culture can change the world as it unites people, countries, religions, and customs. It works as a healing tool in our broken societies.” Kahu-jo-daro Catalogue, and the earlier ‘The Lost Stupa’, are about finding and building everlasting peace, brick by brick, book by book.

Kahu-jo-daro Buddhist Stupa – Catalogue of the Kahu-jo-daro terracotta, architectural and sculptural relics in the collection of the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya, Mumbai. Introduction by Sabyasachi Mukherjee; Research and catalogue entries by Dr Aparna Bhogal; Design and production by Prachee Sathe; Supported by Bank of America.

Release of Kahu-jo-daro Buddhist Stupa Catalogue on 17 November 2026 with Trustees and dignitaries on the dais: (second from right) Author and Director General Sabyasachi Mukherjee, (third from right) Dr Aparna Bhogal, Research and Catalogue entries for the Catalogue. Photo-credit: CSMVS, Mumbai



About Raju Mansukhani
Raju Mansukhani, based in New Delhi, is a researcher-writer on history and heritage issues; a media consultant with leading museums, non-profits, universities and corporates in India and overseas. Contributing regular columns, book reviews and features in the media he has drawn attention of the new generations to critical issues and personalities of Indian and Asian history. Over the last three decades he has authored books on diverse subjects including the media, palace architecture, sports and contemporary history. Through in-depth documentaries, he has profiled leading Asian public figures highlighting their research and publications.
View all posts by Raju Mansukhani →

 

German chemicals firm Evonik to sell off its art collection

22.11.2026

Photo: Benjamin Westhoff/dpa


German chemicals company Evonik is selling off a large part of its art collection at auction, with works by Markus Lüpertz, Imi Knoebel and Emil Schumacher estimated at €100,000 to €150,000 ($108,400-$195,100), the Cologne auction house Van Ham said on Sunday.

The 10 most important works will be offered at the evening auction on December 2, while another 450 works will be offered in online auctions, including pieces by big names such as Max Ernst and Sigmar Polke, Van Ham said.

In the past, it was common for industrial companies to build their own art collections. Today, more and more companies are parting with their often extensive collections, which once furnished offices and corridors.

Previous art concept no longer fits

The art sale was not for economic reasons, an Evonik spokeswoman said in response to a dpa query. With the move from the RAG high-rise to the new headquarters in the western city of Essen, the previous art concept no longer fits, she said.

Caring permanently for art objects was also not part of the company's remit, she said. The spokeswoman added: "This approach is no longer contemporary and can be better fulfilled by other social groups."

She said the proceeds would go to the Evonik Foundation to strengthen initiatives in education and science.

The Evonik art collection comprises several hundred works of contemporary art, including paintings, watercolours, drawings, prints, photographs and ceramics.

According to the company, Evonik has not acquired artworks on a large scale since 2007. In 2025, the company decided to part with the entire collection.


What Is Happening To ASEAN? The Indo-Pacific’s Geo-Economic Battleground – Analysis





Key Takeaways:

Concurrent Russian warship visits, ASEAN finance-minister talks with the IMF and World Bank, and deepened ASEAN+3 economic ties illustrate Southeast Asia’s growing role as a contested geo-economic meeting point rather than a coordinated agenda.

ASEAN’s maritime geography and rising FDI inflows (US$226 billion in 2024) attract major powers seeking market access, supply-chain control, and technological influence, yet limited value capture and fragmented hedging leave the region vulnerable to asymmetric interdependence.

Converting this attention into collective advantage requires deeper market integration, investment policies that mandate technology transfer and local linkages, and coordinated resilience in energy, food, and digital infrastructure so ASEAN can set the terms of engagement.



Something interesting is unfolding in Southeast Asia. In early October 2026, Russian Pacific Fleet warships visited Jakarta before continuing their journey to Malaysia. At almost the same time, ASEAN finance ministers met with the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Bangkok. Earlier, ASEAN had also deepened economic cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea. Are these events merely diplomatic activities that happen to have occurred close together, or do they reflect a changing position of ASEAN in the competition among global powers?

There is no evidence that all these events form a coordinated agenda. However, viewed through a geo-economic lens, a strategic pattern cannot be ignored: ASEAN is increasingly becoming a meeting point for the interests of major powers in trade, investment, technology, financing, energy and security. The issue is not simply why the world is interested in ASEAN, but who will gain the greatest strategic advantage from this growing engagement.

From Military Competition to the Contest for Economic Influence

The visit of three Russian Pacific Fleet warships to Jakarta from 30 September to 4 October 2026 was officially described as a friendship mission and an opportunity for professional exchanges. The visit therefore cannot be interpreted directly as the formation of a new military alliance. However, defence diplomacy remains one of the instruments for maintaining strategic relations and creating space for broader cooperation.


Meanwhile, on 13 October 2026, ASEAN finance ministers held a dialogue with World Bank President Ajay Banga in Bangkok. The discussions covered private capital mobilisation, infrastructure, artificial intelligence (AI), digital transformation, energy and job creation. The IMF also projects ASEAN growth of 4.9 per cent in 2026 and 4.7 per cent in 2027. On the trade front, ASEAN Plus Three (together with China, Japan and South Korea) recorded two-way trade of US$1.4 trillion in 2025. Foreign direct investment from the three partners into ASEAN reached US$44.8 billion.

These facts show that interest in ASEAN is moving through different channels. Russia is present through defence diplomacy; China, Japan and South Korea through trade and investment; while the IMF and World Bank operate through macroeconomic stability and development financing. This does not mean that all these actors share the same objectives. On the contrary, it is precisely the divergence of their interests that makes ASEAN increasingly strategic.

When Economic Instruments Become Sources of Power

Edward Luttwak, through the concept of geoeconomics, explains how competition among states is increasingly pursued through economic instruments. In this competition, tariffs, investment, financing, technology, market access and control over supply chains can function as sources of strategic influence.


From this perspective, ASEAN is not simply a region offering business opportunities. It is also an arena in which major powers seek to maintain market access, create economic dependencies, secure supplies of raw materials and expand technological influence. China has an interest in maintaining its trade and production networks in Southeast Asia. The United States has interests in Indo-Pacific security, strategic technologies and supply-chain diversification. Japan and South Korea have interests in production stability, energy and market access. Russia seeks to maintain strategic relations with countries in the region.

This is where geo-economic competition takes place – not always through direct confrontation, but through competition for infrastructure contracts, factory locations, export markets, energy resources, technology standards and strategic partnerships.

The framework of weaponised interdependence developed by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman deepens this analysis. In global economic networks, interdependence is not necessarily symmetrical. States that control critical nodes in financial, technological or supply networks can use these positions to influence other states.

ASEAN faces a dilemma. Connectivity with multiple powers expands opportunities for investment and trade, but it also creates vulnerabilities when access to technology, financing or markets is used as a source of pressure. The greater the economic integration, the more important it becomes to manage the risks of dependency.


Why Does the Indo-Pacific Position Make ASEAN Contested?


ASEAN’s advantage lies not only in its population or the size of its market. Its geographic location connects the Indian and Pacific oceans, while the Strait of Malacca and surrounding sea lanes form an important part of global trade and energy flows.

Under these circumstances, stability in Southeast Asia has consequences beyond the region. Disruptions to shipping lanes, tensions in the South China Sea or fragmentation of supply chains could increase trade costs, disrupt energy supplies and alter investment decisions.

Therefore, the competition for influence in ASEAN is directly linked to the economic configuration of the Indo-Pacific. Countries with strong trade relations, infrastructure access and technology partnerships in the region gain strategic positions within the regional economic network. However, geography alone does not guarantee power. A strategic position produces bargaining power only when ASEAN countries can transform their locational advantages into industrial, technological and institutional capacity.

ASEAN is indeed becoming increasingly attractive to global capital. The ASEAN Investment Report records that FDI flows into the region reached US$226 billion in 2024, an 8 per cent increase while global investment weakened. However, large investment flows do not automatically mean that ASEAN captures the largest share of value added. Differences in economic structures among members, technological capabilities, workforce quality and domestic supplier linkages determine the extent to which investment generates productivity and national income.


This is where the concept of hedging becomes relevant. ASEAN countries seek to maintain relations with multiple powers without becoming fully dependent on any single one. This strategy can expand economic options and reduce geopolitical risks. However, if each country pursues its own strategy without coordination, ASEAN could instead become divided by competition to attract investment and external support.

In other words, the region can become both an economic magnet and a battleground. Both possibilities can exist at the same time. The decisive question is whether ASEAN can manage this competition in pursuit of its collective interests.

To achieve this, several strategic steps could be taken by ASEAN.

First, ASEAN needs to strengthen market integration, reduce cross-border trade barriers and improve logistical connectivity. A more integrated regional market would increase bargaining power compared with a situation in which each country negotiates separately.

Second, investment policy should be oriented towards technology transfer, local supplier development, skills upgrading and the creation of higher-value jobs. The measure of success should not be limited to the value of investment entering the region, but should also include the ability of domestic industries to move up the value chain.

Third, ASEAN needs to strengthen resilience in energy, food, financing and digital infrastructure. Diversifying partners is important, but diversification must be accompanied by domestic capacity so that it does not merely replace one form of dependency with another.

Fourth, ASEAN centrality needs to be translated into practical coordination. Cooperation with China, the United States, Russia, Japan, the IMF and the World Bank should be assessed according to its benefits, risks, transparency and contribution to the region’s long-term interests.

The growing global attention to ASEAN is therefore not only an economic opportunity but also a strategic test. The region possesses important geographic advantages, markets and production networks. Yet these advantages can become either sources of bargaining power or sources of vulnerability. The real question is not whether ASEAN is being contested by global powers. The more important question is whether ASEAN can determine the terms of their engagement.

If it succeeds, ASEAN can turn global competition into investment, technology and productivity. If it fails, the region risks becoming a place where different powers pursue their own interests while ASEAN countries capture only part of the benefits. In the era of geoeconomics, power is determined not only by who comes to ASEAN, but also by who controls the networks, creates value added and shapes the rules of the game.


About Dr. Eko Setiobudi
Dr. Eko Setiobudi, SE, ME, is an economist, lecturer at STIES Mitra Karya Bekasi, Indonesia, and business practitioner. His areas of interest include macroeconomics, fiscal policy, international trade, financial markets, economic development, and global economic affairs. He writes analytical commentaries on Indonesia, ASEAN, Asia, and the evolving global economic order.
View all posts by Dr. Eko Setiobudi →
Shenzhen Was Not Yalta, But A Clear Sign Of A Massive Geopolitical Shift – OpEd


Russia's President Vladimir Putin with President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru (cropped)


November 21, 2026

By Murray Hunter


Key Takeaways:

The first Trump–Xi–Putin trilateral in Shenzhen produced only a brief “declaration toward peace” on nuclear risks, energy supply, and UN reform, with no ceasefires, arms-control numbers, or binding settlements.

The author argues the real significance was symbolic: hosting the meeting in China’s technology hub and seating the three leaders as equals publicly marked the end of unchallenged American primacy and the operational arrival of multipolarity.

Shenzhen is framed as the opening of a process rather than a grand bargain, leaving Washington to choose between attempting to reverse the shift or engaging selectively to shape an already multipolar order.



The images from Shenzhen this week will endure longer than the sparse communiqués. Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin sat around a circular table in China’s southern technology hub, the first time the leaders of the three largest nuclear powers had ever met as a trio. Western commentators rushed to invoke Yalta 1945, warning of a new carve-up of the world.

However, that comparison is lazy and inaccurate. Shenzhen was not Yalta. It produced no detailed spheres of influence, no redrawn maps, and no binding settlement of the wars currently grinding on. What it did produce, however, was something more significant in the long run, a public recognition that the era of unchallenged American primacy is over, and that a multipolar order is no longer theoretical but operational.

The concrete outcomes were deliberately vague. The leaders issued a short “declaration toward peace.” They reaffirmed the longstanding principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” and agreed to continue dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing proliferation. Indded, some of this narrative could have been aimed at US intentions over Iran.


They endorsed United Nations reform so the organisation can better fulfil its core mission. They committed in principle to increasing the production and supply of refined petroleum products to stabilise global energy flows. And they stressed the importance of immunity for state officials and warned against what they called jurisdictional overreach by the International Criminal Court.

That is the sum of it. No ceasefire in Ukraine. No detailed roadmap on Iran. No new arms-control treaty with numbers or verification regimes. Critics in Washington and European capitals have been quick to dismiss the whole exercise as empty theatre.

They miss the point. The theatre itself was the message. Holding the meeting in Shenzhen, rather than in a neutral European capital or on American soil, was deliberate. Shenzhen is the emblem of China’s technological and industrial ascent, the city that rose from fishing villages into a global centre of electronics, AI, advanced manufacturing and innovation.


By hosting Trump and Putin there during the APEC summit, Beijing asserted itself not merely as an economic powerhouse but as a diplomatic convenor of the first rank. The optics of the three leaders walking together, the carefully staged circular table that placed no one at the head, the Chinese host in the central position, all of this projected equality among great powers rather than hierarchy under a single hegemon.

For decades after the Cold War, the dominant American narrative held that the United States sat at the apex of a unipolar system. Alliances, institutions, the dollar, military reach and cultural soft power supposedly locked in that primacy. Many in Washington still speak as if that world still exists.

Shenzhen demonstrated otherwise. Russia, despite years of isolation attempts and sanctions, returned to the top table. China, long treated as a “peer competitor” to be contained, sat as the host and agenda-setter. The United States was present as one of three, not as the indispensable nation dictating terms.

It is reasonable to assume that Putin and Xi used the closed-door session to impress this reality upon Trump. The American president has long preferred personalised, transactional diplomacy and has spoken of his relationships with both leaders. In Shenzhen he received both the acknowledgement of those relationships and a clear-eyed briefing on the limits of American power.

The world is no longer organised around a single pole. Economic weight has shifted eastward. Military technology diffusion has eroded exclusive advantages. Alternative payment systems, energy routes and institutional frameworks are already operating. The invitation extended implicitly if not in the formal text, was for the United States to participate constructively in managing this multipolar system rather than attempting to reverse it.

This is not a call for American decline or abdication. It is a recognition of structural change. The United States remains the world’s largest economy in many measures, the most powerful military in absolute terms, and an indispensable player on nuclear, technological and financial questions. But the pretence that it can unilaterally set the rules and expect compliance is finished.


The alternative is endless friction, wasted resources and the risk of miscalculation among nuclear powers. Dialogue among the three, however preliminary, is preferable to mutual isolation and proxy escalation.

Comparisons with Yalta fail for another reason. In 1945 the victors of a total war sat down to shape a devastated international system. Today the system is intact but strained. The three powers are not wartime allies dividing spoils but rivals and intermittent partners seeking to manage competition.

The Shenzhen meeting can be better understood as the opening of a process rather than its culmination. Putin indicated afterwards that further meetings should follow. Trump has repeatedly signalled interest in nuclear discussions. Xi has positioned China as a stabilising force while advancing its own vision of multipolarity and “greater democracy in international relations.” Whether these intentions produce substantive follow-up remains to be seen. What matters is that the conversation has begun on terms that no longer assume American monopolarity.

Western analysis has focused heavily on what was not achieved, such as detailed progress on Ukraine or Iran, or concrete cuts in nuclear arsenals. That focus is understandable but incomplete. Great-power diplomacy often begins with symbolism and process before substance. The very act of the three leaders sitting together as equals, in a Chinese city that embodies technological modernity, signals to the rest of the world that the old hierarchy has loosened. Middle powers, the Global South, and regional organisations will take note. They will calibrate their own policies accordingly.

The United States now faces a strategic choice. It can treat multipolarity as an unacceptable challenge to be rolled back through tariffs, alliances of containment and technological denial. Or it can accept the structural shift already underway and seek to shape the emerging order through engagement, selective cooperation and hard-headed defence of its core interests.

Shenzhen suggested that Trump may be open to the second path, at least in personal diplomacy. Whether Washington’s broader political and bureaucratic system follows is another question.

History will not record the Shenzhen summit as a grand bargain that settled the world’s disputes. It was not designed to be one. It will be remembered, if the follow-up materialises, as the moment the three principal powers of the early twenty-first century publicly acknowledged that the post-Cold War unipolar moment had ended. The circular table in Shenzhen was a stage, but the performance reflected a deeper redistribution of power. The United States is no longer the sole architect of the international system. It is one of its principal stakeholders. Accepting that fact is the first step toward managing the competition that will define the decades ahead.

The alternative is clinging to an outdated map of power, which is a recipe for friction without purpose. Shenzhen was not Yalta. It was something more useful: an early, imperfect signal that the world has already moved on. We need to watch what Trump does over the next few weeks to see, whether he will continue in his bombastic direction, or heed the new opportunity hinted to him at Shenzen.



About Murray Hunter
Murray Hunter has been involved in Asia-Pacific business for the last 30 years as an entrepreneur, consultant, academic, and researcher. As an entrepreneur he was involved in numerous start-ups, developing a lot of patented technology, where one of his enterprises was listed in 1992 as the 5th fastest going company on the BRW/Price Waterhouse Fast100 list in Australia. Murray is now an associate professor at the University Malaysia Perlis, spending a lot of time consulting to Asian governments on community development and village biotechnology, both at the strategic level and “on the ground”. He is also a visiting professor at a number of universities and regular speaker at conferences and workshops in the region. Murray is the author of a number of books, numerous research and conceptual papers in referred journals, and commentator on the issues of entrepreneurship, development, and politics in a number of magazines and online news sites around the world. Murray takes a trans-disciplinary view of issues and events, trying to relate this to the enrichment and empowerment of people in the region.
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When Shall We Three Meet Again? – OpEd

November 22, 2026

By Patial RC


Key Takeaways:

The November 19 Shenzhen trilateral produced a short declaration on nuclear risks, energy, UN reform and court jurisdiction but no ceasefires, arms-control measures or concrete progress on Ukraine, Iran, Gaza or Venezuela.

Xi gained host status, Putin regained great-power recognition without public concessions, and Trump secured personalised engagement, yet the absence of affected parties raised concerns about great-power privilege.

The article argues that the summit’s value will be judged only if a follow-up meeting sets measurable objectives and includes the countries whose security the three leaders claim to address.




From Shenzhen’s Historic Summit to the Unfinished Quest for World Peace.

The world expected decisions on Ukraine, Iran, Gaza and Venezuela. Instead, three of the world’s most powerful leaders offered a declaration of peace! Was Shenzhen the beginning of a new international order, or another diplomatic spectacle of Merry Go Round?

“When shall we three meet again? In thunder, lightning, or in rain?” Shakespeare’s famous opening in Macbeth seems remarkably appropriate to the historic November 19, 2026, meeting of US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen China. The three leaders, representing the world’s foremost nuclear powers, assembled at a time when international politics is being battered by wars, geopolitical rivalries, economic uncertainty and a growing crisis of confidence in the existing international order.


The Shenzhen Summit -Historic in Composition

Yet the question confronting the world after their meeting is not simply when the three will meet again. It is what they intend to accomplish when they do. The Shenzhen Summit was historic in its composition, setting and symbolism. For the first time, the leaders of the United States, China and Russia met together in a trilateral format, sitting around a table in a Chinese city that has come to symbolise the country’s technological and industrial transformation. Their encounter conveyed an unmistakable message: the management of global affairs can no longer be understood exclusively through the prism of American primacy. The world has become increasingly multipolar, and the three principal nuclear powers must learn to coexist, compete and, where necessary, cooperate.

But history also demands substance. It expected some indication of how the three leaders intended to deal with the wars and international crises threatening global stability with the two of them directly involved in wars. Ukraine, Iran, Gaza and Venezuela were among the conflicts and flashpoints that made the prospect of a meeting between Trump, Xi and Putin particularly consequential.


Instead, the summit concluded with a short declaration covering nuclear risks, energy supplies, United Nations reform and the jurisdiction of international courts. It reaffirmed that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. It produced no announced ceasefire, no arms-control framework, no timetable for negotiations and no concrete settlement of the conflicts that had made such a gathering necessary. The world had expected more than a photograph.

Ukraine: The war in Ukraine was perhaps the most obvious test of the summit’s credibility. Putin’s participation alongside Trump and Xi offered an opportunity to explore whether Moscow could be persuaded to move towards negotiations and whether Washington and Beijing could jointly encourage a meaningful diplomatic process.

For Trump, the prospect of ending the war would have represented a major diplomatic achievement. For Xi, it offered an opportunity to demonstrate China’s capacity to act as a responsible international power. For Putin, the summit itself provided recognition and an opportunity to present Russia as an indispensable participant in decisions about European security.

But the fundamental difficulty remained unresolved. Russia’s territorial demands, Ukraine’s sovereignty, Kyiv’s security guarantees and the future of European security cannot be reconciled through a private understanding between three presidents alone.The world therefore expected Shenzhen to open a credible diplomatic channel. It did not receive a publicly announced roadmap.

Iran: The conflict involving Iran presented an equally urgent challenge. The confrontation has implications far beyond the immediate parties, affecting international energy markets, maritime security and the stability of the wider Middle East.

Trump has considerable military and economic leverage over Tehran, while China and Russia maintain relationships that could give them diplomatic influence. A coordinated approach among the three could potentially help prevent further escalation, encourage negotiations and restore confidence in the security of the Strait of Hormuz.


The world was entitled to expect some indication that these different sources of influence might be used constructively.Instead, the summit’s general language on energy security and stable supplies offered little reassurance about the underlying security crisis. Oil and petroleum products cannot flow freely merely because three presidents agree that energy stability is desirable. Shipping lanes must be protected, military escalation contained and political differences addressed.

A genuine diplomatic initiative would require commitments to de-escalation, meaningful negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, and guarantees for the safety of international shipping.Shenzhen could have been the starting point for such an initiative. The declaration did not establish one.

Gaza: The tragedy in Gaza presented another question that the three leaders could hardly ignore. The continuing humanitarian consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have exposed the limitations of international diplomacy and deepened public frustration with the inability of powerful governments to translate their influence into lasting peace.

The United States possesses exceptional influence over Israel. China has sought to position itself as a supporter of Palestinian rights and a more prominent diplomatic actor in the Middle East. Russia, too, has relationships across the region.

Together, the three countries could encourage a more sustained international effort focused on civilian protection, humanitarian access, the prevention of renewed hostilities and a credible political process.

Yet Gaza did not emerge as a concrete outcome of the Shenzhen declaration. This omission is difficult to reconcile with the summit’s stated ambition of promoting international peace and security.

Venezuela: Venezuela represents a different but equally important test of the emerging multipolar order. Its political crisis, international alignments, economic difficulties and relationship with Washington have long made it a point of geopolitical contention.

For Washington, Venezuela is a question of regional security, political legitimacy and American influence in the Western Hemisphere. For Moscow and Beijing, its relationship with the United States also touches upon wider questions of sovereignty, external intervention and the limits of American power.

The Shenzhen meeting could have offered an opportunity to establish a common principle: disagreements over political systems and international alignments should not automatically become grounds for military confrontation or coercive intervention.

The objective should be a peaceful political process, respect for the Venezuelan people’s right to determine their future and an end to policies that risk turning the country into another theatre of great-power rivalry.

No specific Venezuelan settlement was announced at Shenzhen. Nevertheless, the issue illustrates why a meaningful dialogue among the three powers should extend beyond the conflicts that directly involve them.


Three Leaders, Three Different Calculations

Xi Jinping emerged as an important beneficiary of the summit’s symbolism. China hosted the meeting and presented itself as a diplomatic convenor capable of bringing Washington and Moscow together. Shenzhen was an appropriate showcase for this ambition. It symbolised China’s transformation into a technological, industrial and economic power with global diplomatic aspirations.


Putin appears to have gained the most immediate political advantage. Despite the continuing war in Ukraine and Western sanctions, he sat alongside the American and Chinese Presidents as an equal participant. He received international recognition without making any publicly established concession on the central issues dividing Russia from Ukraine and the West.

Trump secured the spectacle of direct engagement with two major strategic competitors. His preference for personalised, transactional diplomacy was evident throughout the meeting.

The summit offered him an opportunity to demonstrate that his personal relationships could produce agreements where conventional diplomacy had failed. The absence of meaningful commitments on Ukraine, Iran and nuclear arms control left that proposition unproven.

Shenzhen did not reveal any differences between Xi and Putin. Instead, it demonstrated how difficult it will be for Washington to separate their strategic interests.
The Three Leaders Discussing the World Future

Nevertheless, the image of three powerful leaders discussing the future of international security without the participation of many countries directly affected by their decisions carries uncomfortable historical echoes. Ukraine, European allies, Gulf countries, Palestinians, Taiwan and other regional actors cannot be treated as pieces on a geopolitical chessboard.

Multipolarity should not become another expression for great-power privilege. without consultations with the stake holders.Indeed, the credibility of a multipolar order will depend on whether it provides greater representation and security for smaller countries rather than simply creating additional centres of power.


From Declarations to Decisions


The most important lesson of Shenzhen is that diplomatic engagement must become a continuing process rather than an isolated event. The declaration on nuclear weapons provides a useful starting point. Agreeing that UN requires reforms was another agreement in common. But reaffirming that nuclear war must never be fought is not equivalent to accepting binding restrictions on nuclear arsenals or establishing effective mechanisms for crisis management.

Energy security, maritime safety, artificial intelligence, cyber threats and international financial stability should become additional areas of practical cooperation.


When Shall We Three Meet Again?


The answer should not be when the next international crisis has become uncontrollable. It should be before the next crisis reaches that point.


The three leaders should meet again soon, but the next meeting must have a substantive agenda, measurable objectives and a mechanism for following through on commitments.

A second summit should not be another occasion for grand declarations and diplomatic photographs. It should examine what progress has been made on nuclear risk reduction, establish a continuing consultation mechanism and assess whether the three governments have used their influence to encourage peace in Ukraine, Iran and Gaza and prevent confrontation elsewhere, including Venezuela.

The world will judge Shenzhen not by the grandeur of its setting but by the consequences of what follows. If the world’s most powerful leaders cannot use their combined influence to address a humanitarian catastrophe, questions will inevitably arise about the practical meaning of their declarations.

Shakespeare’s three witches meet amid thunder, lightning and rain. Our three contemporary protagonists have an opportunity to do something rather different. They can meet again when the noise of war grows tired of itself, when the temptation to exercise power gives way to the responsibility to preserve peace, and when negotiators recognise that human lives are more important than geopolitical calculations.

When shall we three meet again? Soon, certainly. But next time, let it be not merely to make history, but to change it.

The Shenzhen Summit has opened a door. The three leaders have demonstrated that they can sit around the same table. Now they must demonstrate that they can make difficult decisions together without deciding the fate of other nations over their heads.


About Patial RC
Patial RC is a retired Infantry officer of the Indian Army and possesses unique experience of serving in active CI Ops across the country and in Sri Lanka. Patial RC is a regular writer on military and travel matters in military professional journals. The veteran is a keen mountaineer and a trekker.
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Russia’s Reported NATO Demands Raise Alarm In Central Asia, Caucasus


 RFE RL
By Zamira Eshanova and RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service


Key Takeaways:

A reported Russian negotiating paper demanding NATO forces return to 1997 positions would also curtail the alliance’s Partnership for Peace ties with South Caucasus and Central Asian states, which have provided training, border security and professional military education since the 1990s.

NATO responded that the evolution of these partnerships is solely for allies and partners to decide, while Georgian and Kyrgyz analysts warned that treating the regions as bargaining chips would undermine sovereignty and push countries toward alternative partners such as Russia or China.

Governments in Bishkek, Tbilisi and elsewhere have so far remained publicly silent, though experts urge them to reject any such limits in closed-door talks and, if necessary, issue a joint regional position.


The recent US effort to restart stalled talks on ending the Ukraine war has sparked attention far beyond the battlefields, including in two strategically important regions of the former Soviet Union that the Kremlin still regards as its own backyard.

A report in The New York Times on November 13 cited a Russian negotiating paper that reheated old demands for NATO to pull its forces back to their 1997 positions. Besides having a huge impact on alliance posture in Europe, any such move would also affect NATO activities in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

A deal is far from done, but security experts, diplomats, and politicians from Bishkek to Tbilisi are paying close attention.

NATO’s Reach

NATO’s cooperation with these regions began in 1994, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all joined the alliance’s Partnership for Peace program. Tajikistan followed in 2002.

Designed to build practical security ties without requiring NATO membership, the program expanded over the decades to cover military training, border security, counterterrorism, cyber defense, and armed forces modernization.

At its peak, Georgia and Kazakhstan regularly hosted multinational drills and there were US military facilities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.


These drills no longer take place — ties between Washington and Tbilisi have been particularly strained — and the bases have long since closed. But the security ties persist and continue to play a role.

NATO cooperation with Georgia spans cybersecurity, special forces, and crisis management. Armenia and Azerbaijan have pursued more selective ties, while Central Asian states use the partnerships primarily for professional military education and to diversify their traditional security relationships.

“Countries would lose access to alternative military expertise, training networks, institutional reforms, and Western standards,” Vakhtang Kapanadze, who twice served as chief of Georgia’s General Staff and is a former military representative to NATO and the EU, told RFE/RL.

“Their main contribution is improving military professionalism, interoperability, defense planning, institutional resilience, and the ability to cooperate with multiple international partners,” he added.

Kapanadze said losing these ties would leave countries looking for alternative partners, which could be Russia or China.


NATO’s Response: A Test Of Credibility?


Asked by RFE/RL to comment on Moscow’s reported demands, a NATO official pushed back without naming Russia directly.

“Any decision on the further evolution of these partnerships is the exclusive prerogative of NATO allies and of the partners concerned,” the official said in a written response.

Kapanadze believes NATO will seek to uphold these principles but says its ability to do so depends on political unity, particularly between Washington and its European allies.


“Ultimately, NATO’s credibility depends on ensuring that smaller states are not treated as bargaining chips,” Kapanadze said. “Any settlement affecting Ukraine, Georgia, or other post-Soviet countries should involve those countries directly and respect their sovereign choices, especially when the broader Black Sea region and Central Asia warrant no less strategic attention than the Baltic states.”

So far, governments across Central Asia and the South Caucasus have met the leaked Russian paper with public silence. It remains unclear whether Moscow formally communicated its position to those governments before reportedly circulating the negotiating paper during US-Russian-Ukrainian peace talks in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11.

Analysts in Kyrgyzstan, a country closely tied to Moscow through trade and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), warned that the things Moscow reportedly wants strike at the heart of regional independence.

Kyrgyz political analyst Emil Joroev told RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service that it “undermines the sovereignty of Central Asian countries. First and foremost, it is an attempt to restrict their right to determine and formulate their own independent foreign policy and decide for themselves whom they engage with.”

While Joroev said he does not expect Kyrgyzstan or its neighbors to issue formal diplomatic protests, he argued that regional leaders must confront Moscow directly behind closed doors during high-level summits.

“These issues must be raised in those very meetings, and it must be made absolutely clear that our countries will not accept such actions,” he said.

Bakyt Amanbaev, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to the United States, went further, arguing that Moscow has no authority to dictate the region’s external partnerships, and that remaining silent is not enough.

Speaking to RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Amanbaev said that “no country has the right to determine and conduct the foreign policies of Central Asian states on their behalf.”

“It would be entirely appropriate for the foreign ministers of Central Asian countries to come together and articulate a clear and specific position,” he added.



Zamira Eshanova is a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service.


About RFE RL
RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.

TIT FOR TAT

Drones attack cargo ship in Gulf of Finland, Russia says

22.11.2026

Photo: Markus Lenhardt/dpa

By Katharina Schröder and Hannu Aaltonen, dpa

A Russian cargo ship was attacked by two drones in the Gulf of Finland, the governor of Leningrad Province, Aleksandr Drozdenko, said in a Telegram post on Saturday.

He said the ship was bound for the Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad.

A rescue team went to the freighter, but the crew refused to be evacuated, insisting they will continue once the ship is repaired, Drozdenko wrote later. 

Finnish Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen spoke of a suspected airspace violation by a Russian helicopter, saying it could be linked to rescue and search operations, in a statement.

Earlier, the Finnish Border Guard had reported that a Russian freighter was on fire in the eastern Gulf of Finland and that it was leading a rescue operation and preparing possible measures to address environmental damage within Finnish jurisdiction. 

The damaged vessel had drifted from international waters into Finnish territorial waters, the Border Guard said. 

The Finnish Defence Ministry also referred to a drone attack on the Russian vessel. Air and maritime traffic in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland had been restricted as a precaution, it said.

Earlier, Drozdenko reported Ukrainian drone attacks in Leningrad Province, which surrounds the city of St Petersburg. He said 73 drones had been repelled overnight but provided no details of possible consequences.

Russia launched the war on Ukraine with a full-scale invasion in February 2022.

 

Mercury probe BepiColombo enters orbit after eight-year journey


22.11.2026

Photo: Stephane Corvaja/ESA/dpa

The European space probe BepiColombo has reached Mercury after an eight-year journey through the inner solar system, entering orbit around the solar system's smallest planet, the European Space Agency (ESA) said early on Sunday.

"We've heard back from Bepi," ESA said on X, confirming that the spacecraft was in contact with mission control.

The probe can now begin preparing for its main scientific mission. Its initial orbit is expected to bring it within 674 kilometres of Mercury's surface.

The €1.7 billion ($1.9 billion) mission, a joint project between ESA and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), aims to learn more about the planet closest to the sun.

BepiColombo's two satellites will use a range of scientific instruments to study Mercury's magnetic field, map its surface and investigate its core and thin atmosphere. Scientists hope to establish whether water is present, what the planet is made of and how it formed.

Launched in October 2018, BepiColombo has travelled more than 10 billion kilometres to reach Mercury. The mission is run from the ESA Control Centre in Darmstadt near Frankfurt.

The probe's two satellites were separated from their propulsion module in September and have now been captured by Mercury's gravity while still attached to each other.

They are scheduled to separate in December, with both expected to reach their final orbits by March 2027. Scientific operations are due to begin in April.