US Army Lasers Blast Drones, Proving Directed-Energy Weapons Are Future

Joint Task Force Southern Border personnel use the Army Multipurpose High Energy Laser system to engage and defeat three hostile unmanned aerial systems along the U.S. southern border, Aug. 25, 2026. Photo Credit: Army Sgt. Daniel Huerta

 August 29, 2026

By DoW News

By C. Todd Lopez

Earlier this week, service members assigned to Joint Task Force Southern Border used the Army Multipurpose High Energy Laser system to stop three hostile, unmanned aircraft systems deemed a threat. They were believed to be linked to drug cartels. 

“The successful defeat of these adversarial drones is a direct testament to the readiness, vigilance and technological edge of the [joint task force],” said Army Maj. Gen. Curtis Taylor, Joint Task Force Southern Border commander. “By integrating layered countermeasures alongside advanced directed-energy capabilities like this laser system, we have made it clear that we will not tolerate hostile surveillance.” 

The operation marks the first use of the laser system to defeat cartel-linked drones along the southern border. 

Using directed-energy weapons, such as this, is part of the future of warfare, a War Department official said.  

“The future of warfare obviously is going to include mass attritable drones,” the official added.  

The department will procure hundreds of thousands of drones as soon as next year, as well as counter-UAS technology, including directed-energy systems. 

“The department is proliferating directed-energy technology to protect the homeland and the southern border,” the official said. “And [U.S. Northern Command and Joint Task Force Southern Border are] deploying these capabilities to take out any … cartel drones that are doing incursions at the border.” 

Directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, can be used to take out both drones and incoming cruise missiles, at a much lower cost than using more expensive kinetic weapons like missiles. Developing scaled directed energy weapons systems, such as what was used at the border, is one of the department’s six critical technology areas.  

The other areas include: applied artificial intelligence, biomanufacturing, contested logistics technologies, quantum and battlefield information dominance, and scaled hypersonics. 

“[Directed-energy systems are] low cost per shot, with deep magazines and they can come out against drone swarms,” the official said. “That’s something that’s different than a traditional kinetic system. It’s good for the cost-exchange ratio because … it’s better than us firing a $2 million missile at [an inexpensive] drone.” 

The use of directed-energy weapons on drones is also in line with the department’s counter-drone effort, the official noted. 

In June, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth visited White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where he observed a variety of directed-energy systems in operation, including the first milestone test of the Golden Dome for America. 

“Cutting-edge directed energy was harnessed, and the Dynamic Defense Autonomous Defeat system flawlessly and autonomously cued, targeted and eliminated a multitude of incoming threats,” the secretary said. “This test was executed on schedule and dynamically defeated every threat. I watched our elite warfighters integrate with next-generation technology to stop incoming drones and cruise missiles dead in their tracks.” 

In July, the War Department awarded two agreements under the Joint Laser Weapon System program to advance the next-generation cruise missile and unmanned aerial system defense architecture. The agreements have an initial award value of $86 million and a total program ceiling of $847 million. The Joint Laser Weapon System program is meant to transition directed-energy capabilities from demonstration prototypes into field-ready, production-oriented platforms. 

“We must actively defend the homeland against emerging threats,” said Emil Michael, undersecretary of war for research and engineering and chief technology officer for the War Department. “We are partnering with industry to rapidly deliver deep magazine directed energy capabilities to the joint force that can be seamlessly deployed across multiple domains.”

About DoW News

DoW News publishes news from the US Department of War, previously known as the Defense Department.

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Assessing The U.S. Army’s Patriot Air And Missile Defense System – Analysis

Test firing of a US Patriot missile. Photo Credit: Jason Cutshaw, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command

the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

By Robert Holcombe and Andrew Feickert

Key Takeaways:

• Patriot is the Army’s mobile ground AMD system for aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles; it uses a phased-array radar, engagement control station, and launchers firing MIM-104 variants, with current U.S. buys centered on Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 MSE hit-to-kill interceptor.
• The Army has 15 active Patriot battalions and plans three more from FY2029–FY2031 (about $1.8 billion per four-battery IBCS/LTAMDS battalion); many allies have requested or already field Patriots, though Denmark and Switzerland have looked at European alternatives over delivery delays.
• Congress is focused on interceptor shortages amid Iran and Ukraine demand, FMS backlogs, possible Navy use of PAC-3 MSE on Aegis ships, Golden Dome roles, and whether Patriots are being used against cheap drones they were not designed to fight.

The Patriot air and missile defense (AMD) system is an Army ground-based mobile system designed to detect, track, and engage aircraft, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), cruise missiles, and short-range or tactical ballistic missiles. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in the cost, availability, and production of Patriot systems and interceptors, particularly in view of conflicts in Iran and Ukraine.

Background

Patriot is an acronym for Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target. Beginning development in the 1960s, the first Patriot battalion was activated in May 1982. Originally designed to defend against high-performance aircraft, according to the Army, in January 1991, “Patriot successfully intercepted and destroyed an Iraqi SCUD missile fired at Saudi Arabia. This was the first combat use of the Patriot, and the first time an air defense system destroyed a hostile tactical ballistic missile.”

Patriot Components and Capabilities

According to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) and information from Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence (accessed by CRS via electronic subscription) by Janes, an unclassified defense intelligence company,

• the Patriot system generally consists of the following components: a radar set, engagement control station (ECS), missile launchers, and Patriot missiles. The radar set is made up of an AN/MPQ-53/65 C-band, multifunction phased array radar system that is remotely controlled by the AN/MSQ-104 ECS. RTX (formerly Raytheon) is the prime contractor for the system; Lockheed Martin makes a new type of interceptor missile.
• The radar can detect, track, and prioritize more than 100 potential targets and has a range of over 100 kilometers (km). The ECS is the only crewed element of a Patriot unit (typically by three operators) and is designed to communicate with the launching stations and other Patriot units and higher headquarters. To power the radar and ECS, each Patriot unit has a truck equipped with two 150-kilowatt generators.
• Each vehicle-transported missile launcher can accommodate 4-16 interceptors (depending on missile variant). The missile launcher can be located separately from the radar, and ECS and can be ready to fire a missile in less than 9 seconds. Once launched, the interceptor transmits data to the radar station, which tracks and helps guide the missile to its target. 
• Patriot can operate in semiautomatic and automatic modes. Semiautomatic mode, according to Janes, provides “a high degree of computer-based engagement support, autonomously classifying and identifying tracks, automatically querying them for identification friend-or-foe (IFF) response, and then providing recommendations to the operators in the ECS. At this point, a human operator makes the go/no go decision to proceed with an engagement.” 
• In the automatic mode, all processes are carried out autonomously by the system. The automatic mode is no longer used by the Army because of past fratricide (friendly fire) incidents, although it remains in the system’s capabilities.
• Patriot systems can operate independently but are primarily designed for point defense, meaning they can “protect a specific asset or location, and are best deployed as part of a layered missile defense system … Patriot systems [can] work with other missile defense systems such as THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system] to form a multi-tier, integrated, overlapping defense,” MDAA states.

Patriot Interceptor Missiles

While the radars, ECS, launchers, and other supporting components have been modernized and improved since Patriot’s inception, according to Janes, “the most significant developments to the system since initial fielding have been to its missiles.” Patriot employs the MIM-104 series missile, of which there are 12 main variants. Janes notes the following:

The missile family is divided into two broad subfamilies: the MIM-104A to MIM-104E (including PAC-1, PAC-2, PAC-2 GEM and derivative missiles), which operate on a blast/fragmentation principle for engagement of aircraft and limited engagement of tactical ballistic missiles; and the MIM-104F (including the PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE missiles), which are much smaller munitions designed specifically for engaging ballistic missiles, with a limited capability for engaging aircraft.

Patriot employs a variety of missile variants. One example reportedly is the older Raytheon-produced PAC-2 GEM (Guidance Enhanced Missile) variant that explodes near its target and is used against aircraft and cruise missiles. The Army is currently procuring the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor (produced by Lockheed Martin), described as 

a high velocity hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile capable of intercepting tactical ballistic missiles, air breathing threats, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems. The MSE represents the current generation PAC-3 missile which provides expanded battlespace performance against evolving threats and has been fully integrated into the Patriot system (US and international partners) … and the [THAAD] system (US only).

Reportedly, the Army is working to develop and acquire newer, more capable and cost-effective Patriot interceptor variants.

Patriot Foreign Military Sales

According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs congressional notification releases from 2001 through August 18, 2026, the State Department notified Congress of proposed foreign military sales (FMS) for the Patriot systems to the foreign governments listed below. Some of the listed foreign governments have received Patriot systems; others are awaiting delivery. Information provided by DSCA and the State Department does not differentiate between delivered or pending delivery status.

Foreign governments that reportedly acquired the Patriot system prior to 2001 were identified in Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence and are marked with an asterisk.

Bahrain, Turkey, Egypt*, Germany, Greece*, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and The United Arab Emirates

In September 2025, Denmark reportedly canceled its August 2025 Patriot FMS request and opted instead to acquire the French/Italian-developed SAMP/T system, in part because of shorter delivery times. In March 2026, per press accounts, Switzerland reportedly was considering acquiring a European alternative for Patriot systems previously requested through FMS, in part because of potential delivery delays of four to five years.

Integrating PAC-3 Missiles on Aegis Guided-Missile Destroyers

The Navy reportedly plans to integrate PAC-3 MSE missiles on some of its Aegis guided-missile destroyers. Reportedly, software changes to the Aegis system and the PAC- 3 MSE will be required. The developer, Lockheed Martin, reportedly anticipates an initial land-based test in early 2027 and initial operational capability (IOC) in 2028.

Patriot Force Structure 

According to information provided to CRS by the Army, 15 Patriot battalions are currently in the Active Component with plans for three additional battalions: one battalion each year from FY2029 to FY2031. A four-battery Patriot battalion, equipped with the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) and the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) costs an estimated $1.792 billion (procurement).

Patriot and the Golden Dome Program

The Golden Dome program is an integrated homeland AMD system being developed by the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025. DOD plans to combine a range of capabilities to create a “system of systems” to protect the United States from “aerial attacks from any foe.” While formal Patriot unit requirements are not thought to have been officially requested, Patriot has reportedly been mentioned as a possible component of an initial Golden Dome architecture. 

Potential Issues for Congress

Congress may consider several potential oversight questions. 

• What are the current Combatant Command Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) requirements for the Patriot system? Does the Army currently have enough ready systems, munitions, and personnel to meet these requirements?
• What is the current DOD force posture and manning guidance for Patriot units? Are current deployments of U.S. Patriot systems leaving other theater operational areas unprotected? If so, how is DOD mitigating this risk?
• What supply chain bottlenecks are inhibiting the production of Patriot systems and munitions? What other systems rely on the same critical materials? How does DOD prioritize/influence the distribution of such materials to manufacturers? What is the desired DOD production rate for Patriot systems and munitions? How might Congress facilitate DOD in achieving desired production rates?
• How many Patriot systems are under contract for production through FMS, under agreement to be provided, or temporarily employed to defend foreign nations? What are the total requirements for foreign Patriot systems?
• How many nations are authorized to coproduce Patriot systems, components, or munitions? What authorities or agreements does the United States have to utilize foreign production lines? How could the United States utilize foreign production lines or additional/new production lines or agreements to supplement the U.S. manufacturing base?
• To what extent are Patriot systems postured against enemy threats that the system was not designed to counter (e.g., low-cost drones)? What is the cost-benefit analysis of this posture? How might other systems be utilized against such threats? Are there more appropriate munitions that can be developed or procured to be used with the Patriot system?
• What threat is Patriot intended to counter as part of the Golden Dome program?

About the authors:

• Robert Holcombe, U.S. Army Fellow
• Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

About CRS

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

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MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Indonesia-China Naval Drill Could Help Normalize Beijing’s Presence East Of Taiwan – Analysis

Chinese and Indonesian ships in a joint exercise east of Taiwan, Aug. 12, 2026. (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China)

 August 28, 2026

By RFA

By Taejun Kang 

Key Takeaways:

• China and Indonesia held a brief Aug. 12 passing exercise east of Taiwan—Beijing’s first joint naval activity with a foreign military in those waters—which Taipei sees as an attempt to normalize Chinese presence, not a change in the military balance.
• Jakarta calls it routine diplomacy by a ship already transiting home from Vladivostok; analysts say the value for Beijing is a third-country record of cooperation on Taiwan’s Pacific flank, a likely resupply route in a blockade.
• The episode matters more if it is repeated, grows more complex, draws other navies, or is later cited in maritime and aviation paperwork; overplaying it could also make partners such as Indonesia more cautious.

Though China’s first-ever naval exercise with another country’s military in waters east of Taiwan this month was a relatively small operation, it could go a long way toward normalizing Beijing’s presence around the democratic island.

The Chinese frigate Honghe and Indonesia’s KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai-332 conducted a passing exercise east of Taiwan on Aug. 12, involving maritime communications, formation maneuvers and replenishment of fuel and supplies at sea. Reuters described it as China’s first joint operation with a foreign military in those waters.

China, which considers Taiwan to be part of its own territory, described it as a “navigation exercise.” 

Taiwan, however, accused Beijing of using the drill to create the impression that China exercises jurisdiction over waters east of the island.

Though the exercise itself was a brief three-hour meeting of ships which then went their separate ways, the exercise gave Beijing a record of a foreign navy conducting an activity with China in waters that Taipei says Beijing has no authority to police, Aniello Iannone, a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian politics at Diponegoro University in Indonesia, told RFA.

“Once the Indonesian navy sailed, Beijing acquired something it could not manufacture alone, corroboration, from a state with no stake in the Taiwan question, that the water east of the island is a place where cooperation with China happens normally,” he said.

Taiwan’s military said the exercise did not change much from a security perspective. Wu Tien-jen, assistant deputy chief of the general staff for intelligence, told lawmakers that the Indonesian vessel was already traveling through the area, and that the activity had no direct military impact on Taiwan, though he said it carried geopolitical significance.

Jakarta played down the significance of the exercise, saying its warship was returning from exercises in Vladivostok and that such passing exercises were routine acts of maritime diplomacy.

Normalizing China’s presence

Indonesia has diplomatically transitioned to a Taiwan stance that aligns with China’s position more closely than many other governments—including by issuing a joint statement affirming Beijing’s one-China principle in November 2024.

But its participation in exercises with China east of Taiwan does not mean that it intended to legitimize Beijing’s presence in the area, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA.

“For Jakarta, it’s just routine defense diplomacy activities. But for Taipei, the concern is the precedent that such an activity could create,” he said. “Jakarta may not intend to lend legitimacy or normalize China’s military presence around Taiwan, but Beijing can still use the participation of a foreign navy to reinforce the impression that its military activities in these waters are increasingly normal.”

The location gives the episode greater significance for Taiwan, according to analysts. 

Unlike Taiwan’s western coast, which faces mainland China across the Taiwan Strait, its eastern approaches open onto the Pacific and are regarded as crucial maritime lifelines in the event of a Chinese blockade or conflict, and Taipei has become increasingly concerned about Chinese activity there. 

China’s coast guard began patrols east of Taiwan in June, later drawing expressions of concern from the United States, Britain, France and Germany. Taiwan subsequently reported a sharp rise in Chinese government-vessel activity around the island and warned that Beijing could be testing ways to disrupt Pacific supply routes.

During its annual nationwide Han Kuang military exercises this month, Taiwan’s navy and coast guard also held their first joint anti-blockade drill, including a scenario in which a merchant vessel carrying essential supplies was escorted toward ports in eastern Taiwan.

“The eastern approaches are the only side of Taiwan not overlooked by the Chinese mainland,” Iannone said. “That’s where resupply would come from in a blockade, and where American forces would arrive.”

He argued that Chinese survey ships, coast guard patrols and now the Indonesia exercise could be understood as part of a broader attempt to make Beijing’s presence east of Taiwan appear administrative and routine rather than exceptional.

The more important test will be whether the Indonesia exercise remains an isolated event, Kristanto said.

A single passing exercise, or PASSEX, “is unlikely to change the status quo,” he said. “It would become more strategically meaningful if this develops into a pattern whereby similar exercises occur repeatedly, involve more foreign navies, become operationally more complex, or take place closer to Taiwan.”

Altering geopolitical narratives

The key threshold could come if other countries begin to regard cooperation with China in those waters as politically unremarkable, Kristanto said.

“In that scenario, Beijing would not necessarily need countries like Indonesia to directly endorse its sovereignty claims,” he said, adding that the cumulative effect could still help normalise the PLA’s presence around the island. 

Repetition of this exercise with the navies of other countries would shift the burden of the argument, Iannone said.

“Against an event, Taipei can object,” he said. “Against a routine, Taipei has to ask the international system to un-normalize something already normalized, which is a far harder thing to organize.”

Iannone said more complex exercises, participation by additional navies or operations moving closer to Taiwan would strengthen Beijing’s case, but he also pointed to a less visible, but possibly more valuable indicator: whether records of such cooperation are cited as evidence of established practice. 

“The one I’d watch hardest is documents,” Iannone said. If records of joint activities east of Taiwan began to appear in notifications from the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, or in arguments that attempt to declare the territory part of China’s exclusive economic zone, “that’s the transition from imagery to legal material.”

But there are also limits to how much Beijing can gain from such exercises.

Kristanto said Indonesia retains control over how it describes its military cooperation and has been careful to characterize the Aug. 12 drill as limited and routine. Jakarta also conducts military exercises with a wide range of countries, meaning the China drill alone does not demonstrate a strategic realignment.

Beijing could even undermine its own objective if it attaches too much political meaning to foreign participation, he said.

“If China attaches too much political significance to those interactions, it could make partners who do not want to be entangled in the geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. and its allies more cautious about participating in similar activities in the future,” Kristanto said.

Indonesia and China nevertheless signaled this week that broader defense cooperation is continuing. During high-level “2+2” talks in Jakarta on Aug. 20, their foreign and defense ministers agreed to deepen security ties, including military exercises and defense industry cooperation.

For Taiwan, however, the concern is less whether Indonesia itself moves closer to Beijing than whether similar interactions begin accumulating without attracting much resistance.

“Effective jurisdiction doesn’t arrive through recognition, but it accumulates,” Iannone said. “No sovereignty changes hands at any point, what it shifts is the threshold at which something registers as worth noticing, and that threshold is where the political work happens.”

About RFA

Radio Free Asia’s mission is to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press. Content used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.

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Natural Gas Drilling Could Raise Salt Levels, In Turn Boosting Radium In Water

To collect samples, researchers from Penn State traveled to different locations around Washington and Greene Counties in Southwestern Pennsylvania. CREDIT: Provided by Nathaniel Warner

 August 25, 2026

By Eurasia Review

Key Takeaways:

• A Penn State study of 91 private wells and springs in southwestern Pennsylvania found that elevated radium levels in drinking water were associated with some nearby unconventional oil and gas (fracking) operations, but the overall correlation was limited and all measured concentrations remained within EPA legal limits.
• Higher salinity near extraction sites can mobilize naturally occurring radium from surrounding rock into groundwater; however, salinity itself can also arise from non-drilling sources such as road salt, septic systems, or animal waste, making a simple causal link to fracking incomplete.
• Only a small subset of samples (six) showed possible links to fracking wastewater, indicating localized rather than widespread impacts; further research with larger samples and examination of abandoned wells is needed to clarify long-term effects on regional groundwater quality.

Pennsylvania ranks second in U.S. natural gas production, accounting for about one-fifth of U.S. output in 2024, and has one of the most extensive histories of energy extraction in the country. A team of researchers from Penn State is trying to better understand the environmental impacts of these sites — specifically, if fracking is increasing radium content in local drinking water.

According to a new study recently published in Environmental Science and Technology, the answer is not a simple yes or no. The team recorded higher salt concentrations in samples taken closer to energy extraction sites, indicating that natural gas drilling might contribute to elevated salinity in the ground, in turn releasing radium — a radioactive chemical — and other heavy metals trapped in the surrounding rock into drinking water. 

The team connected with homeowners across Washington and Greene Counties in southwestern Pennsylvania to collect samples from 91 private water wells and springs, testing if nearby fracking-based oil and gas operations contributed to higher concentrations of radium in the groundwater. The team found elevated radium content was associated with some drilling operations, as well as higher salt concentrations in the water. However, the recorded upticks in salinity and radium could also be associated with a host of other environmental factors aside from energy extraction. 

Radium can be found in the ground at very low concentrations everywhere in the environment, explained Nathaniel Warner, associate professor of environmental engineering at Penn State. However, drinking water with elevated radium levels can pose serious health problems, including an increased risk for cancer. 

“Radium has a chemical makeup sort of similar to other metals like calcium, so it follows in the body where those chemicals naturally go,” Warner explained. “Your body says, ‘I need calcium for my bones, so I’m going to send some calcium there, along with some radium that I’m drinking.’ Over time, that radium will decay, releasing particles and energy that will damage your cells.” 

Oil and gas drilling traditionally involves mining into oil or gas pools miles underground. However, as these wells have depleted over decades of use, unconventional oil and gas (UOG) drilling has emerged to access previously untapped fuel reserves. UOG uses a process known as fracking to extract fuel from the ground, shooting a high-pressure mixture of water, sand and chemicals to break apart rock horizontally from the initial borehole.  

“The big difference is really the scale of the operation — the amount drilled and the amount of water used to frack and break apart the rock,” Warner explained. “In UOG, you’re drilling miles down, but then also drilling miles out horizontally. With that said, there are a lot of similarities in the impacts you might see associated with UOG and conventional operations.” 

Previous research by another team at Penn State had associated elevated “hotspots” of salt content near UOGs, particularly in the Northern Appalachian Basin, stretching from Alabama to upstate New York. According to Warner, these areas of elevated salinity can carry up to 200% higher risk for radium-related health effects, because introducing salty chemicals can knock existing radium off surrounding rocks and into underground freshwater reservoirs. 

However, little research had examined whether these drilling operations were specifically responsible for increased radium content in groundwater. Previous studies had focused on upticks in deep brine salts like sodium, chloride, barium and strontium in areas that had experienced oil or gas spills, but radium measurements were notably absent. 

The team began by reaching out to homeowners living within different distances to UOG operations, specifically within about half a mile, just under two miles and slightly more than three miles. Embarking on several field campaigns to collect samples of drinking water from the homes, the researchers directly tapped into residents’ private wells before the water was exposed to any type of treatment system, such as faucet filters. Once the samples were collected, they returned to the lab and analyzed the samples’ radium and salt content.

Through this process, the team was able to do more than just take readings on the radium content of the water — they were able to pull broad insights about the homes’ water quality, which they shared back to the homeowners. Jennifer Baka, associate professor of geography at Penn State, explained how studies like this help not just researchers, but the local communities they’re conducted in. 

“Communities want to know what is in their drinking water and whether it is safe to drink,” Baka said. “Over the course of years, we have established relationships with communities living in close proximity to UOG operations in order to gain their trust and help address their concerns.” 

Of the 91 samples, six could potentially be associated with the presence of fracking wastewater, the researchers reported. This indicates that although the correlation is not broadly generalizable to all extraction operations, spills or other mismanagement could contribute to localized impacts. Samples taken from within three kilometers, or just under two miles, were more likely to exhibit elevated radium levels, although it was not significant enough to cite as a broad correlation. Additionally, all radium levels remained within the Environmental Protection Agency’s legal limits across the board.  

Warner said that examining radium content in relation to UOG operations is one piece in a larger puzzle of understanding how residential and industrial development impacts the groundwater quality of an area. 

“Radium levels tend to increase in areas with higher salinity, but that salinity can come from a host of other factors,” Warner said. “Road salt, nearby septic tanks, even animal waste can all contribute to increasing salinity in an area.” 

According to Warner, more research will be critical to fully encapsulate the impacts UOG operations have on salinity in nearby groundwater, and in turn, radium content. In addition to continuing their radium work with larger samples and more targeted sampling near oil wells, the team said they want to expand their search to abandoned oil and gas wells across the region to see how historical natural gas drilling is impacting the community today.

Other co-authors affiliated with Penn State include Susan Brantley, Atherton Professor and Evan Pugh University Professor Emerita of Geosciences; Brandon Forsythe, assistant research professor of earth and mineral sciences; Lara Williams, a geosciences doctoral candidate; Allison Fenske, assistant professor of engineering at Juniata College, who earned her doctorate from Penn State; and Sam Shaheen, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Minnesota, who earned his doctorate from Penn State.