Combatting Japan’s agricultural worker shortage

3 March 2022

Author: Yusaku Yoshikawa, JIN Corporation

One of the biggest challenges for agriculture in Japan has been its chronic worker shortage. The industry’s jobs-to-applicants ratio is higher than other sectors and during the COVID-19 pandemic it has been a struggle to secure enough workers.

In the latest 2020 Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) expressed concern about the country’s weakening agricultural production base due to a rapid decrease in farmland and the number of self-employed farmers.

Still, questions remain around how Japan’s agricultural labour shortage is playing out on the ground and what policy solutions might be pursued.

The number of Japanese farmers has been decreasing sharply. The 2020 Census of Agriculture and Forestry in Japan reported that Japan had 1.52 million agricultural workers. In 2015, the number of agricultural workers was 1.97 million, representing a 20 per cent decline in five years. In 2020, agricultural workers consisted of 1.36 million self-employed farmers, and 160,000 employed farmers — defined as those who work for other farmers for more than seven months of the year. This number is less than one third of what it was in 1980 and continues to decline by 50,000 people per year.

The number of farming households has fallen 20 per cent in 10 years, from 2.2 million in 2010 to 1.7 million in 2020. Yet moves to upsize farms has been slow and some farmlands of over 400,000 hectares are being abandoned. Among these 1.7 million farming households, 40 per cent, or about 700,000 of them are relatively small-scale farmers. They possess less than 3000 square metres of operating, cultivated land and often produce below 0.5 million yen (US$44,000) in agricultural product sales.

Japan’s low rate of food self-sufficiency (37 per cent on a caloric basis and 66 per cent on a production value basis in 2021) is often presented as a case in point to justify the need for more farmers. The MAFF basic plan, which aims to ‘improve the nation’s capacity for food self-sufficiency and establish its food security’, typifies this argument. To fulfil these objectives, it aims for a food self-sufficiency rate of 45 per cent on a caloric basis and 75 per cent on a production value basis by 2030.

To achieve this goal, MAFF promised to commit to several measures, including smart agriculture. For example, the use of technologies like drones, robots and a public platform for agricultural data collection have been promoted to save labour and cut production costs.

Some also argue that Japan needs more young self-employed farmers to secure the agriculture industry’s long-term sustainability. Japan’s food production is extremely dependent on elderly workers. The average age of the country’s self-employed farmers is over 65. While approximately 53,700 self-employed farmers joined the industry in 2020, only one third of them (18,400) were below 49 years old. A high turnover rate for young newcomers in the industry is a common phenomenon. As a result, the proportion of young farmers has been decreasing.

To promote the active participation of young people in the industry the Japanese government should create a supportive environment for prospective farmers. Becoming a self-employed farmer requires big investments, especially in terms of funds, farmland and skills. In 2017, Japan’s National Chamber of Agriculture reported in a survey that it took at least two years for almost half of new farmers to start their own farm. The average start-up cost for farming was 5.7 million yen (US$50,000), which is similar to the country’s average annual income for males.

Japan’s agricultural labour shortage also hits farmers hard during the labour-intensive harvest season, when part-time workers are often difficult to find. Because of this, many Japanese farmers are trying to secure foreign workers. COVID-19 made this problem worse by preventing foreign workers from entering the country.

Many foreign agricultural workers in Japan are recruited under the government’s Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). TITP trainees — who tend to come from countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and China — numbered approximately 350,000 in 2021. Still, the TITP has been criticised as merely a means for farmers to access cheap labour despite the program’s initial aim to foster capacity development among trainees. To attract more foreign workers, improving their treatment, particularly their salary and working conditions, should be of the utmost priority.

Japan’s agricultural worker shortage stems from a number of problems in the Japanese labour market and demographic situation, each of which require different solutions. Given this situation, there is no one simple fix. Instead, the government must take a comprehensive approach towards the issue through smart agriculture, measures to support for young self-employed farmers, the upsizing of farms and measures to improve conditions for foreign agricultural workers.

Yusaku Yoshikawa is an aid consultant at JIN Corporation.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

The China–Russia condominium in Kazakhstan

4 March 2022

Author: Loro Horta, Dili

In early January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced its worst riots in recent history. Many observers argued that the riots could undermine Chinese interests in this resource-rich country. But the situation is far more complex.

Over the past decade, China has emerged as an important economic player in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. By 2016, China’s largest state-owned oil company, Sinopec, along with a few other companies, had invested over US$20 billion in the Kazakh oil and gas fields. In 2019, Chinese investment in Kazakhstan totalled US$27.6 billion.

Two-way trade between China and Kazakhstan surpassed US$15.4 billion in 2020, with China importing primarily oil and gas and Kazakhstan importing textiles, machinery and metals. In 2020, China accounted for over 18 per cent of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade and there were more than 700 joint companies.

Traditionally, the Kazakh elite was educated in the former Soviet Union. While some have pursued studies in the United States and Europe, the number of scholarships provided by China is far greater than those provided by any other country. Several Kazakh ministers and senior security officials have studied in China. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is fluent in Chinese and served in China as a diplomat. Beijing has invested significant resources in cultivating the Kazakh elite and this investment has paid off.

China’s main interest in Kazakhstan is access to the country’s vast energy supplies. Oil and gas imports from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan, reduce China’s dependence on the Middle East. Central Asian energy routes also allow China to bypass the Malacca Strait in case of conflict with the United States. Trade and investment have gained China powerful friends among the Kazakh elite and ensured the protection of its interests. But among the Kazakh population, Chinese soft power remains weak. There have been several anti-Chinese riots in Kazakhstan in the past decade. Chinese policies in Xinjiang also contribute to negative views of China. Ethnic Uighurs in Kazakhstan account for 1.5 per cent of the population.

In contrast to China’s economic success, Russia’s economic presence has seen a significant decline, but Russian soft power remains somewhat high. Strong ties between Kazakhstan and Russia date back to the Tsarist monarchy and the Soviet period. Over 20 per cent of Kazakhstan’s population is of Slavic ancestry. According to UNESCO, an estimated 60,000 Kazakhs were studying in Russia in 2019, while 15,000 were studying in China. Russian language and cultural influence remains high. Russian TV stations are far more popular than local stations.

Yet there are anti-Russian sentiments among the Kazakh population. Some fear that Russia may annex territories in Northern Kazakhstan, where the majority of the population is of Slavic origin.

Knowing the limits of its influence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, Beijing has focused on the economic front and energy resources, deferring to Moscow on security and political matters. Beijing has been careful not to upset Russia as an important ally. Moscow has in turn allowed China to claim a greater share of Kazakh energy resources.

Central Asian leaders believe that Russia would only intervene militarily to defend their regimes in case of internal turmoil. Russian troops deployed to Tajikistan in the 1990s during Tajikistan’s civil war and in 2010 Kyrgyzstan requested Russian military assistance to deal with internal instability. China, on the other hand, has limited itself to providing diplomatic and financial support.

Following the January 2022 riots in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh government requested Russian assistance to quell the disturbance. But, by the time Russian troops were deployed, the Kazakh government already had the situation largely under control. The presence of Russian troops served more as a powerful deterrence to internal opponents, rather than an operational necessity. Over 2000 troops were deployed under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russia-led military alliance. The troop deployment demonstrated to internal opponents that the government has powerful allies around its borders.

Kazakhstan’s increasing dependence on China and Russia may further erode US influence in the country and impact its billion-dollar investments in the energy sector. But Kazakhstan will continue to court US, European and Japanese investment as a way to mitigate its excessive dependence on China and Russia. Kazakh leaders have often tolerated Western criticism over human rights to preserve lucrative economic ties. Kazakhstan is likely to continue this policy but with much less room to manoeuvre.

Some Western observers believe that the January riots may undermine Chinese influence in Kazakhstan. But it may have the opposite effect. The rapid deployment of Russian troops further demonstrated to Kazakh leaders that Russia is the ultimate guarantor of their security. During the crisis, China limited itself to statements of solidarity and offers of economic assistance. Central Asian leaders know that they need the assistance of both powers. Under the China–Russia condominium, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders seem to be secure in power.

Loro Horta is a public servant based in Dili and is a former Timor-Leste ambassador to Cuba.

Tokayev wins the battle but the war is not over in Kazakhstan

26 February 2022

Author: Gennady Rudkevich, Georgia College

The main result of the January 2022 Kazakhstan protests was to solidify the transfer of power from Nursultan Nazarbayev to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that began with the latter’s assumption of the Kazakh presidency in 2019. While there are still many unknowns relating to the protests, which led to at least 225 deaths, President Tokayev responded by initiating a crackdown against top Nazarbayev supporters and promising to enact major economic reforms. 

Tokayev’s ability to forestall another protest wave will depend on his ability to distance himself from the corruption associated with the Nazarbayev regime and to create a modern welfare state. 

The protests began in the western city of Zhanaozen after the government lifted a cap on liquefied petroleum gas prices, aggravated by pandemic-related labour unrest and long-term grievances relating to inequality. The protests quickly spread across the country, with the most violent clashes occurring in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. The speed with which the protests spread and the degree of violence unleashed by both pro- and anti-government forces caught many off-guard, including President Tokayev. 

The survival of Tokayev’s regime was far from guaranteed until it counter-attacked with significant force and (primarily Russian) Collective Security Treaty Organisation peacekeepers were rapidly deployed. It wasn’t long before Kazakh officials began talking about a foiled coup. Despite limited evidence linking the violence in Almaty to Nazarbayev supporters, some of his loyalists were arrested. 

While Nazarbayev’s personal involvement is still unclear, his former prime minister and security chief, Karim Massimov, was charged with treason. Removing Massimov, whose background and ties with China made him a potential rival for the presidency, allows Tokayev to reshape Kazakh society without facing elite dissent. 

The protests in Kazakhstan were based on local grievances, which were aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While popular discontent has been brewing in Kazakhstan for years, the economic consequences of the pandemic might have pushed many otherwise politically apathetic citizens onto the streets. 

When the effects of the pandemic wane, the government will be better positioned to use its substantial energy resources to pacify much of the discontent. Whether those resources will be used to deal with Kazakhstan’s inequality is less certain. Strengthening the rule of law without giving a greater role to civil society and a more independent press has rarely worked in similar countries.

If it is true that Nazarbayev’s loyalists played a major role in unleashing the violence, then the crackdown against those loyalists and Russia’s open support for the Tokayev regime can be used to distance Tokayev from the corruption associated with Nazarbayev and his inner circle. There seems to be genuine popular support behind ‘de-Nazarbayevification’. Cracking down on corruption carried out by Nazarbayev’s supporters should buy Tokayev enough good will to make people overlook his regime’s own shortcomings in that area.

The Kazakh public’s perception of the crackdown is harder to gauge. Those closest to the protesters are aware of the violence used by the authorities, including against those protesting peacefully. This is likely to create tensions in Almaty for the foreseeable future. The popular desire for stability and the government’s control over information should limit the damage to Tokayev’s legitimacy as long as he is able to return a sense of normalcy. If the crackdown expands beyond Nazarbayev’s inner circle, the Kazakh government will have traded short-term stability for long-term resentment. 

Russia’s role in ending the protests will remain a source of anger in nationalist circles. Russian politicians talking about Kazakhstan in terms previously reserved for Ukraine will not be well received. But the mostly symbolic use of Russian peacekeepers and their quick withdrawal should minimise the degree of anti-Russian enmity. 

As Russia wields its newfound influence behind closed doors, most Kazakh citizens will focus on more immediate concerns. Given the substantial ethnic Russian minority in northern Kazakhstan and Russia’s role as the guarantor of the Tokayev regime, Kazakh elites will be careful not to add fuel to the anti-Russian sentiment. 

Several of the causes of the Kazakh protests — the economic consequences of the pandemic and the corruption linked to Nazarbayev — won’t have the same effect in the future if Tokayev continues his current path. The crackdown against the main Nazarbayev allies should prove to be popular and the Kazakh government is unlikely to cut back on social protections for the foreseeable future. 

The large-scale violence against Almaty protesters will create lasting local problems, but the broader fallout should be limited. Russia’s role in the protests will harm Tokayev’s legitimacy with the nationalist segment of the population, but that damage should decrease over time. Removing the proximate causes of the protests doesn’t address the systemic problems of inequality and corruption, neither of which are likely to be resolved in the context of Kazakhstan’s current political model. Another wave of protests based on a future misstep by the government cannot be ruled out. Protests have already resumed in Zhanaozen, this time over a lack of jobs.

Gennady Rudkevich is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia College.

South Korea’s populist turn

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

7 March 2022

South Koreans will head to the polls to elect a new president this Wednesday, 9 March. With campaigning characterised by mudslinging and populist rhetoric, the contest has been dubbed the ‘unlikeable election’.

Leading the race is Yoon Suk-yeol of the main conservative opposition People Power Party (PPP) and a former prosecutor general under the current Moon Jae-in administration. Yoon jumped ship after clashing with the administration over prosecutorial reform, and his reputation as a tough investigator who doesn’t bend to political pressure has propelled him to the top of many pre-election polls.

Closely following Yoon is progressive ruling Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, a former mayor and governor in Gyeonggi province. Starting out as a factory worker who then injured his arm in an industrial accident before turning to politics, Lee is promoting a rags-to-riches story as part of his promise to roll out a universal basic income and address wealth inequality.

Trailing the two leaders was Ahn Cheol-soo, a renowned former doctor and software entrepreneur of the centrist opposition People’s Party. This positioned Ahn to play the role of spoiler or kingmaker.

Just six days out from the election, Ahn withdrew from the race and threw his support behind Yoon. With Sim Sang-jung of the small opposition leftist Justice Party unable to gain traction, the four-way contest has now been stripped down to two.

The issues that voters are most concerned about are the cosy relationships that breed corruption between political elites and the chaebol (the family-owned conglomerates that dominate the South Korean economy) and socioeconomic and standard-of-living issues such as housing affordability and jobs. These issues gained traction against the backdrop of the 2016-17 candlelight protests, which saw millions take to the streets to demand the ouster of then president Park Geun-hye who was ultimately impeached.

While Moon Jae-in promised hope and change, many in South Korea feel too little has been done. It is unclear whether Yoon or Lee can do much better in the areas where voters demand the most progress. Neither of the two leading candidates have any experience as legislators in the National Assembly – a first in South Korea’s democratic history. Yoon and Lee each routed nominees from their own parties with more experience and pedigree, helped by scandals that tarred their opponents.

Both are also beset by scandals and drama of their own.

Lee’s wife is accused of using a government employee as her personal assistant and misappropriating public funds, while Lee himself is under scrutiny for a suspicious land development deal and rumours of ties to organised crime.

Yoon has been forced to apologise for his wife’s fraudulent CV, and to deny accusations of connections to a cultist shaman and a predilection for anal acupuncture.

The negative style of campaigning that has characterised the election has left a significant number of swing voters and younger voters still undecided in the lead up to the poll.

In our first lead article this week, Myungji Yang explains that Yoon’s tactics to win the presidency are focused on winning young male voters through a ‘divisive “us-versus them” strategy’. This involves demonising gender equality as the cause of South Korea’s economic woes. Yoon has promised to ‘abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, among other anti-feminist signals’.

Yoon’s approach is to tap into the frustrations of young men surrounding social mobility and the continuing widening of wealth inequality, themes portrayed so starkly in the South Korean global smash TV show Squid Game. Skyrocketing housing and rental prices in Seoul and an unemployment rate of nearly a quarter of South Koreans aged 15-29 highlight the problems. It is an approach that appears disingenuous given that South Korea is a male-dominated society which ranks 108 out of 153 countries in the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap report.

Lee’s core pledge of a universal basic income has also been labelled populist. To his supporters it is the sort of radical fix needed to address the growing wealth gap. But his detractors say he is seeking to buy votes with free money and the economics of his policies don’t add up.

Amid the populist pledges and mudslinging, both Yoon and Lee have failed to outline how they will address chaebol reform. Neither candidate has touched on the issue in their campaign manifestoes or shown signs in campaign debates that they will bring serious pressure to bear on chaebol elites.

The populist turn in South Korea politics also comes at a time when South Korea’s geopolitical position is becoming more challenging than ever.

As Peter K Lee explains in our second lead this week, ‘the next South Korean president will face a difficult conundrum between North Korea and China. South Korean leaders on both the left and right have long claimed that North Korea’s denuclearisation was the foremost priority for the region and world peace … Yet North Korea is increasingly of secondary importance to the United States’, behind dealing with China, and now behind Russia too in the wake of its aggressive war against Ukraine.

How the next leader in the Blue House decides to balance the continuation of Moon’s diplomatic outreach to North Korea with policy towards China and Russia ‘will inform South Korea’s position on the Indo-Pacific, wartime operational control, trilateral cooperation with Japan, participation in groupings like the Quad, and prospects for deeper cooperation with partners like Australia’.

If a turn to populism is the way of the future in South Korea politics, the country will again need to rely on its strong culture of civic participation and protest, which gave rise to the 2016-17 candlelight protests, to safeguard the quality of its democracy.

The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

How South Korea’s conservatives hope to

divide and conquer on the way to the

presidency

5 March 2022

Author: Myungji Yang, University of Hawai’i

Five years after the Candlelight Revolution in South Korea, the effervescence, spirit of solidarity and optimism for social change have faded away. When millions took to the streets to oust corrupt president Park Geun-hye in late 2016 and early 2017, Moon Jae-in’s election promised hope and change. Many thought conservative political forces — the corrupt establishment — would lose their political influence.

But as South Korea prepares to elect a new president on 9 March 2022, voters seem more than ready to move on from Moon. The conservatives are back, led by Yoon Suk-yeol, a one-time member of the Moon administration who now leads the primary opposition People Power Party (PPP) and seems to have captured the imagination of those disillusioned with left-leaning policies, especially younger males.

Despite Yoon’s lack of policy knowledge and often reckless remarks, he holds a not-unsubstantial lead over his Democratic Party opponent Lee Jae-myung. In the polls.

One of the most interesting aspects of the imminent 2022 election is that many parts of the electorate have not made up their mind yet. Recent surveys show that both Yoon and Lee’s support rates combined add up only to about 70 per cent, split evenly between the candidates. In previous elections, most presidents-elect received more than 40 per cent of the vote. Both candidates still need to gather more votes. Neither strongly appeals to the broader population and voters are not enthusiastic about the upcoming election.

Yoon is an intriguing and unusual case as he had no experience in electoral politics before becoming the PPP’s presidential candidate. Ironically, he was Moon’s prosecutor general before defecting to the conservatives after the administration pursued prosecutorial reforms. Yet it is not clear what political values and new visions the conservative candidate and his party represent or how they would achieve them. Beyond dyed-in-the-wool conservatives, Yoon’s support is built on voters’ disappointment and frustration with Moon’s performance as president.

Identifying itself as the ‘candlelight government’, the Moon administration promised to realise the values supported by the candlelight protesters — equality, fairness and social justice — but has failed to successfully address important socioeconomic issues. The Moon administration has overseen a rapid increase in housing prices while failing to meet high expectations about social and political reforms.

Further, real estate, college admissions and sexual harassment scandals among high-ranking government officials — although sometimes politicised and exaggerated by conservative media — have led many to believe that the Democrats are not that different from those they replaced. Yoon’s support comes mostly from opposing the incumbent government.

Traditionally, young South Koreans vote for more progressive candidates. A new phenomenon that needs more attention in this election is that Yoon’s strongest political base is young male voters in their twenties. His promise to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, among other anti-feminist signals, has certainly helped him. South Korea’s conservatives have found success by provoking gender conflict and mobilising anti-feminist narratives, arguing that gender equality policies violate meritocratic values and fair competition and result in reverse discrimination against men.

One possible explanation why this message has resonated so strongly with young South Korean men may lie in the efforts of conservative elites to capitalise on frustration and resentment about a lack of economic opportunities and limited future prospects in an extremely competitive labour market.

Instead of pledging to reduce social inequality and increase opportunities for younger generations, conservative presidential candidate Yoon has adopted the easier and more divisive ‘us-versus them’ strategy: men against women. Just as right-wing populists in other countries scapegoat immigrants and minorities by accusing them of taking jobs away from native-born people and threatening the existing social order, South Korean conservatives are hoping to win the presidency with the similar messaging.

The current presidential electoral scene is not what candlelight protestors expected. Left-leaning reformers failed to deliver the socioeconomic changes they promised. Conservatives have learned nothing from their maladministration in the previous government and continue to repeat outdated anti-communist and anti-feminist rhetoric.

Whoever becomes the next president will inherit a huge political burden: the necessity of healing a society wrecked by divisions of gender, generations and class. If the new government continues to rely on a politics of exclusivity and immediate political gain, it will damage South Korean democracy and exacerbate disillusionment with the country’s political class.

Myungji Yang is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Hawai’i, Manoa

South Korea’s candlelight protests

7 February 2017

Author: Sun-Chul Kim, Emory University

Political protest has always propelled South Korea’s democratisation. It was through the mass uprising in April 1960 that South Koreans ended the autocratic rule of Syngman Rhee. The democracy that followed the ‘April Revolution’ was short-lived, but the subsequent military regimes of Park Chung-hee (1961–79) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980–87) had to cope with a recalcitrant opposition that tirelessly protested authoritarian rule. In June 1987, another mass mobilisation eventually forced the authoritarian rulers to concede democratic reforms.

Political protest did not slow down with South Korea’s transition to democracy. On the contrary, street protest became the new normal as democratic space expanded. Students, workers, civic organisations, and even opposition political parties and lawmakers took to the streets in protest of government policies. Observing the pervasiveness of protest in South Korea in 2008, an Al Jazeera reporter came to the conclusion that ‘protest has become part of [South Korean] culture’. Given this context, the recent candlelight protests that erupted in response to the scandals of President Park Geun-hye and her confidante, Choi Soon-sil, were no isolated event.

The use of candlelight as a form of protest traces back to 2002 when two teenage girls were killed by US armoured vehicles on military training manoeuvres. A proposal for a candlelight vigil circulated among internet cafes after the news spread that the US soldiers responsible for the deaths of the Korean girls had been acquitted in the US court-martial. Thousands gathered in Gwanghwamun Square to commemorate the victims. The candlelight vigil was picked up by activist groups and turned into a symbol of the movement against the perceived injustice. Ever since 2002, mass demonstrations in South Korea have taken the form of candlelight protest.

The advent of the candlelight protest signified important changes distinct from earlier protests. In the past, it was impossible to picture a protest scene in South Korea without conjuring up the image of violent clashes and the exchange of teargas and Molotov cocktails between protesters and riot police. Violent protests persisted into the 1990s, well after South Korea’s democratic transition, but the emergence of the candlelight protest offered a new platform that enabled protesters to convey their seriousness of intent through peaceful means.

Specifically, the candlelight protests of the past three months have been remarkable in their absence of violence, despite the high political tension and massive number of protesters roaming the streets. On the one hand, this had to do with greater tolerance on the part of the police and favourable court rulings that opened up new marching routes previously unavailable to the protesters — a trend not uncommon during times of revolutionary change. But it also had much to do with the adept handling of the rallies and marches by the organisers.

The weekly candlelight protests were organised by Emergency Action for Park’s Resignation, a coalition of more than 1500 civic organisations. In the past, large coalitions were often plagued by fierce infighting among competing political groups. To avoid discord, the anti-Park coalition set rules for decision making based on the lowest common denominator among participant organisations.

Its role was focused on providing political space for citizens of all walks of life to come and express their views freely. From booking celebrities to setting up lost-and-found services, the coalition paid close attention to the details of the rallies to make them more accommodating to all.

Combined with unprecedented levels of frustration and anger among South Koreans, the outcome was explosive. Week after week, the coalition successfully mobilised millions of South Koreans on the streets of dozens of cities and channelled their anger into a powerful political message. Eventually, the candlelight protests pushed reluctant lawmakers to cast their vote to impeach the president in the National Assembly, marking one of the most significant events in South Korea’s political history.

The success of the anti-Park candlelight protests illuminates the growth and maturity of civil society in South Korea. At the same time, it brings to attention the weakness of its party system as a mechanism for political mediation. South Korean political parties have been characterised by their extreme fluidity, which involves frequent splits, mergers and name changes.

In the absence of stable political parties with which to communicate political agendas and develop a shared identity, civil society organisations often bypassed the mediation of political parties when it came to promoting new agendas or resisting policies. Consequently, direct action was frequently used as leverage vis-à-vis the decision makers.

The latest candlelight protest set an unusual example in that street protesters and opposition lawmakers found themselves in sync throughout the impeachment campaign as well as the subsequent legal proceedings. But this rare accord is unlikely to be sustained as the ruling party goes through another split and the fractured opposition field prepares for an early presidential election in late spring, pending confirmation of President Park’s impeachment by the Constitutional Court.

Lacking a reliable partner in party politics, the anti-Park coalition will likely break into multiple political lines as the competition for the president’s office deepens. Precisely because they lack reliable partners in party politics, however, they will most likely get together again and return to street politics when there is another serious breach of democratic principle. Protest politics will continue in South Korea.

Sun-Chul Kim is Assistant Professor of Korean Studies at the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Emory University.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

A Russian Tzar And A Burmese Monarch – OpEd

Myanmar's Min Aung Hlaing. Photo Credit: Mikhail Frolov, Tatarstan President's Office, Wikipedia Common

 March 7, 2022

By Kanbawza Win

The self-appointed, modern Burmese monarch Min Aung Hlaing (MAH) following the advice of a modern Tzar, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who had graciously supplied the Burmese army known Tatmadaw (TMD) meaning (Terrorists Marauding, Dacoits) with the latest modern weapons coupled with a secret advice of not to show any mercy, or sympathy even to the women and children, has now amply demonstrated to the world, with Russia attacking the weaker neighbouring sovereign country of Ukraine. The common denominator between Burmese military regime and the current Russian regime is that they repeatedly lie the very concept of truth, as perhaps they have taken a good example from the Third Reich’s Joseph Goebbels, a master manipulator, and a terrific orator, that knows how to whip up a crowd in a frenzy is the propaganda minister of Adolf Hitler, who said “If you repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it, and you will even come to believe it yourself.” So also, the Burmese cut-throat MAH (ratvdk;) taking a leaf out of its teacher and benefactor, modern Russian Tzar, Vladmir Putin, and knowing very well of how his Tatmadaw backed political party lost miserably in the elections of getting less than 10% of the winning party (the NLD party led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) shuttered at the prospect of going back to the barracks, after ruling the country from 1962 in taking the beloved country to the level of the Least Developed Status. Hence, he had no choice, but to implement a military coup d’état with the blessings of his mentor former General Than Shwe (better known as the Burmese Bulldog).

In an interview with VOA (Voice of America) Myanmar’s military government spokesman Zaw Min Htun has said that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was “justified for the sustainability of their country’s sovereignty and demonstrated Moscow’s position as a world power,” which was also released in Russian. Last year, General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s military chief, met the head of Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoborone in Moscow to discuss “potential military technical cooperation”. He told Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu that Myanmar’s army had “become one of the strongest in the region” thanks to his country’s help, according to Russian news agency TASS. So, it is no wonder when the Myanmar’s military junta expressed its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, placing itself at odds, with most of the world community that has condemned the Russian military action and moved to introduce crushing sanctions on Moscow. (PHOTO)

However, countering Myanmar’s military junta, the opposition Burmese government in exile better known as the National Unity Government of Burma (NUG) issued a statement in support of Ukraine, saying that “The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Burma condemns the unprovoked acts of war directed against Ukraine and its people.” The NUG called the attacks “terrifying in Ukraine is a violation of the United Nations Charter and international law and is not a good example in the 21st century. Moreover, it will be a major obstacle to the maintenance of international peace, security, and human development. Myanmar stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine.” It must be remembered that Coup leader MAH had visited Russia in June last year and there are strong ties between the Burmese and Russian militaries. Russia is one of the few countries to have defended the military council that seized power in a Feb. 1, 2021, coup, overthrowing the civilian government and detaining de facto leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking officials. Since then, U.N. and Burmese experts have repeatedly called for a ban on arms sales to the military council, but Russia has ignored the call. Perhaps, Putin seems to copy the false flag operations and moves to establish puppet states remind us, of what Imperial Japan did in northeastern China, of Manchuria, in the early 1930s and named it as an independent Manchukuo. The world suddenly resembles a century ago when blatant violations of international law prevailed. Have our civilized world any lessons from the two world wars?

Putin’s sabre-rattling recalls some of the stuff that Khrushchev used to do when he banged his shoes at the UN General Assembly. Now that everybody witnessed that Russia and Ukraine’s first round of talks failed to ease Europe’s biggest ground war as Russian missiles pounded Ukraine’s cities and, troops have pressed closer to the capital, Kyiv, resulting in millions of Ukrainians fleeing the country.  International efforts to punish and isolate Russian President Vladimir Putin have intensified and taken aim at his country’s most important finances. Even traditionally neutral Switzerland joined the growing coalition of nations imposing a raft of sanctions on Putin and associates, demanding Russia withdraw its troops immediately. But Putin seems to remain impervious to the pressure and insisted Russia was not targeting civilians in its attacks despite abundant evidence to the contrary. Rather than back down, Putin is driving an increasingly brutal tactics which MAH carbon copied. An embattled Ukraine moved to solidify its bond with the West by applying to join the European Union. It’s a largely symbolic move for now that could take years to become reality and is unlikely to sit well with Putin who has shown that his real concern is not so much security, but bitterness at how in the early 1990s Soviet and Russian leaders handled the secession of states from the then USSR and its’ ultimate collapse. Hitherto, many in the West have viewed Putin as a rational actor who drives a hard bargain. Rational actors can be dealt with by diplomacy and international structures. But recent speeches raise concerns that the Russian president might not be operating rationally. Indeed, he has appeared emotional and unhinged in various claims. Some speculate that there is truly a mental health issue in the mix, like what MAH is going through now as asking the women folks to take care of the security of the army compound and forcing them to carry the guns.  Can Ukraine become a similar war of attrition for Russia, a sort of defeat? At the beginning of the war, perhaps few would have believed, but as time passes, such a scenario seems to become increasingly possible. Contrary to the general atmosphere echoed by the media, numbers, and facts-on-the-ground do not suggest an easy Russian victory; rather, there’s much heavier Ukrainian resistance and Russian losses, and much slower Russian advance than expected. The conflict overall is starting to show signs of evolving into a war of attrition that Russia may not even be able to win, just like in Burma that the Junta could not win the NUG whom it labeled as terrorist somewhat similar a thief crying thief. Burma has been in turmoil since a coup a year ago, with at least 1,500 civilians killed by security forces, according to activists cited by the United Nations, which the junta has also accused of bias. The military has been battling militias allied with a parallel National Unity Government (NUG), which last year called for a nationwide revolt and has been outlawed by the Burmese Junta.                                                                                                                                                                           

 One must recollect that even as Russian President Vladimir Putin wages war against Ukraine, his country’s economy has begun to collapse under the weight of unprecedented penalties of the Western governments. But one would scarcely remember that President Joe Biden spoke 6,500 words about nuclear weapons during his State of the Union speech, but not one of them acknowledged the dangers of nuclear war that have spiked upward during the last decade and even more steeply in recent days. The militarism that Martin Luther King Jr. warned us about has been spiraling toward its ultimate destination in the nuclear era — a global holocaust that would likely extinguish almost all human life on Earth. During this reality, leaders of the world’s two nuclear superpowers continue to fail — and betray — humanity. The world should recollect that in the stark light of March 2022, Albert Einstein’s outlook 75 years ago about the release of atomic energy has never been more prescient or more urgent: “This basic power of the universe cannot be fitted into the outmoded concept of narrow nationalisms. For there is no secret and there is no defense, there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world.” The phrase “narrow nationalisms” aptly describes the nuclear-weapons policies of the United States and Russia. They have been engaged in a dance of death with foreseeable human consequences on a scale that none of us can truly fathom.                        Mr. Shahid cited the UN Charter, the Organization’s founding document, which outlines a world where countries settle disputes by peaceful means, without the threat or use of force. “The violence must stop. Humanitarian law and international humanitarian law must be respected. And diplomacy and dialogue must prevail.” But Putin has not heeded this warning as everybody knows that the Council members voted in favour of the UN General Assembly convening after Russia vetoed a resolution. The resolution gives the Assembly power to take up matters of international peace and security when the Security Council is unable to act due to unanimity among its five permanent members – China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia – who have the power of veto. But while Russia raises the nuclear threat, loses the war of global public opinion, and suffers from the hammering its currency and financial and energy sectors are taking, its troops on the ground continue to dictate events inside Ukraine. In the meantime, that Burmese Junta forces have torched at least 6,158 civilian homes in the 13 months since the coup, mostly in areas where anti-regime resistance is the strongest. Sagaing Region suffered nearly 60 per cent of the damage, according to independent research group Data for Myanmar. 

At least the current Burmese leader MAH is far more honest than Putin in their private life as MAH adopted son is married to the Burmese chief pf police’s daughter gives raison d’être of why the Burmese security forces are so close to each other in their all out war against the entire populace of the country. Whereas Putin is married to Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Ocheretnaya, who was a flight attendant for the Kaliningrad branch of Aeroflot from 1983 to 2014 and now his two daughters Maria and Katerina lives with their mother Lyudmila. But Putin has never publicly acknowledged his children, though media outlets have reported often. Then he had another daughter in 2015 with former Russian rhythmic gymnast Alina Kabaeva. At least in their private life MAH is more honest than Putin. 

MAH, has exchanged numerous visits with senior Russian military officers, though there has been no face-to-face meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even though he has reportedly made several requests to meet with Putin. It was Maung Maung Aye who talks to the Russian army officers about acquiring air defense systems and acquired US$2.3 billion worth of weapons during his trip, according to Russian news agencies. Myanmar military personnel also study at several military schools and training facilities in Russia, including the Omsk Armor Engineering Institute, the Air Force Engineering Academy in Moscow, the Nizhniy Novgorod Command Academy and the Kazan Military Command Academy. While the junta has made clear its position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is not without links to the latter; Ukraine also supplies weapons to the Myanmar military. It purchased from Ukraine an estimated 1,000 BTR-3U armored personnel carriers (APCs) to be assembled in Myanmar. And in 2016-17, Ukrainian arms manufacturers reportedly shipped parts for Mil Mi-2 and Mil Mi-17 helicopters, BTR-3U armored personnel carriers, a ship engine, and ship propulsion and radar systems through a local arms dealer in Myanmar.

But the silver lining for the resistance group is that there are many good Military Council members who do not like the unjust repression of the terrorist military council and have high levels of ideology and want to serve the people and love the truth and want to see the TMD as a professional army that is loved by the people. These people usually defected to the resistances’ side and the resistance has developed support mechanisms for defectors. No doubt there is a growing trend of officers and soldiers leaving the military dictatorship who do not like the unjust repression of the military junta and wish to escape and is estimated that hundreds of deserters fled the Military Council in the first two months of this year including from the Air Force. Hence, let us wait and see how long the marauding Russian Tzar and the Burmese monarch remain on the scene.