Illustration of a hypersonic Next Heneration Glide Body (NXGB). Credit: Lockheed Martin
October 5, 2026
By Shamil Abdullah Saleh
Key Takeaways:
The piece says DARPA’s Aug. 7 request for information on a Next Generation Hypersonic Cruise Missile seeks industry views before any funded program, after HAWC proved scramjet flight but only incremental gains and HACM cut tests from seven to five.
It dates China’s DF-17 as operational around 2019–20 and cites a September 2025 YJ-19 scramjet anti-ship missile, against the U.S. Army Dark Eagle reaching initial capability in April 2026 and appearing at Valiant Shield with a stated range of about 2,175 miles.
The author’s test is production, not physics: design-for-manufacture and non-traditional contractors, or another HACM-style delay that widens a gap the U.S. has not led.
Introduction
Hypersonic missiles do something that conventional cruise and ballistic missiles cannot do; they combine speed (more than Mach 5) with sustained maneuverability mid-flight. This denies the adversary’s air defenses, which seek predictable flight patterns, the ability to intercept the incoming projectile. This combination of speed and maneuverability is the reason why the Pentagon views hypersonic weapons as a potential answer to overcome the increasingly capable air defense networks China and Russia have built along their borders. Whichever state holds a survivable and affordable hypersonic missile can hit time-sensitive targets in heavily defended airspace. The outcome of the hypersonic race, however, will be decided by execution: whether the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) can convert its Next Generation Hypersonic Cruise Missile program from a Request for Information (RFI) into a fielded system faster than its peers can extend their current lead.
On 7 August, DARPA posted a request for information seeking industry feedback on the new Next Generation Hypersonic Cruise Missile (NGHCM). DARPA is not seeking a missile just yet; it is seeking information from industry professionals on what is possible before deciding whether an actual program is feasible. What is evident is that DARPA is not seeking small upgrades. It already mentions that the basic technology works but delivered small and predictable results, but not the kind that would be a breakthrough in future wars. According to the same RFI, states like China and Russia are fielding improved air defense systems, and in the future U.S. missiles may not be effective enough to punch through anymore. The U.S. is already behind when it comes to hypersonic systems; the U.S.’s Dark Eagle reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the first time in April 2026. Compare that with China, whose DF-17 has been operational since around 2019-2020, and the U.S. capability gap is evident.
Evolutionary, Not Disruptive
DARPA’s admission of failure is that in more than a decade of testing hypersonic technology, there have been marginal gains, which is not enough to win the next-generation war. The RFI itself admits that the scale of the problem is definite; it says that prior scramjet demonstrations “successfully proved the fundamental viability of scramjet-powered flight,” but those programs “achieved predictable and incremental gains in isolated performance metrics” rather than a “revolutionary leap” in range, cruise speed or altitude. The admission is notable for an agency to put in a public procurement document that a decade-long effort of hypersonic testing could not achieve results that could have helped the U.S. with future warfighting. China is now moving past the first generation of hypersonic technologies, hypersonic glide technologies, to the next generation of hypersonic missiles: air-breathing scramjet engines. In September 2025, China unveiled the YJ-19, an advanced scramjet-powered hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds. The missile is small enough to fit in standard submarine torpedo tubes.
Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Legacy
HAWC, a joint DARPA/Air Force program, demonstrated that the hypersonic air-breathing system is effective. However, the U.S. is still unable to draw anything concrete out of this program. Its successor, the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), has faced design delays, testing delays, and a reduction from seven tests to five to save money.
DARPA’s RFI for NGHCM is a tacit admission that HACM and HAWC were built and invested in to prove that missiles could fly, not that these missiles could be mass-produced. As DARPA plainly states, it expects a “design for manufacturing and assembly” (DEMA) philosophy to be embraced from the onset, and this time with a realistic path to affordable and high-rate production. China, on the other hand, appears to have prioritized fielding and mass-producing first-generation hypersonic systems over waiting for a technically optimal one, which the U.S. now seeks. This claim is corroborated by independent assessments of China’s faster testing and fielding pace.
This supports the above proposition that although the system works, it may not be able to give any meaningful advantage to the U.S. during the war. Another point to note is that DARPA seeks systems that can be produced cheaply in large numbers; the document notes that older manufacturing methods are making the missile too expensive and too complicated to produce. DARPA’s concern is valid that, in case of conflict, if the missiles are too complicated and expensive to produce, the U.S. wouldn’t be able to mass-produce them.
The Frontrunners?
The U.S. actually has a deeper technical pedigree, with testing of hypersonic systems starting back in the 1950s–60s, with Pershing-II reaching hypersonic speeds (Mach 8); however, it was classified as a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) rather than a modern hypersonic missile, as it had limited maneuverability in the terminal phase. It used active radar terminal guidance for pinpoint accuracy rather than sustained aerodynamic cruising or gliding. Nevertheless, the U.S. has a much older hypersonic missile program compared to China, whose dedicated hypersonic program started in the 2000s, and the DF-17 was unveiled in 2019.
China, however, moved much faster than the U.S. in testing and operationalizing the hypersonic missile program and is considered ahead in the hypersonic race. China has deployed its DF-17 across multiple People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rocket force brigades with Pacific-focused density while the U.S. has just reached its initial operational capability. Chinese missiles are now reportedly expanding into multiple generations of hypersonic weapons across land, sea, and potentially air. At the same time, the U.S. program faced multiple delays, technical challenges, and cost growth, with the U.S. still seeking a quantum leap in hypersonic technology. China accepted early, less sophisticated hypersonic systems into service rather than waiting for more advanced designs, giving its rocket force years of operational experience and production infrastructure before the U.S. had either.
Is the U.S. Catching Up?
As of mid-2026, the U.S. finally deployed the hypersonic missile “Dark Eagle,” with the U.S. Army in the Valiant Shield 2026 exercise in the Western Pacific, which could potentially hit targets around 2,175 miles away. The U.S. is narrowing the gap, but whether it closes it fully remains an open question, since technology-wise the U.S. is still a few years behind. DARPA’s request for industry feedback also supports the proposition that the U.S. has yet to find what it is looking for, but that does not imply that the U.S. is still at the baseline and may need to start from scratch. The U.S. understands the technology; it just seeks the correct tools to implement it effectively.
This, however, is just phase 0: the RFI does not commit any funding to a contractor. Rather, it is gathering information from industry to shape a future program’s technical requirements before any formal solicitation is issued. The U.S. is yet to find a good enough recipe to make a missile that will be a “quantum leap” in overall performance.
The U.S. actually has a deeper technical pedigree, with testing of hypersonic systems starting back in the 1950s–60s, with Pershing-II reaching hypersonic speeds (Mach 8); however, it was classified as a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) rather than a modern hypersonic missile, as it had limited maneuverability in the terminal phase. It used active radar terminal guidance for pinpoint accuracy rather than sustained aerodynamic cruising or gliding. Nevertheless, the U.S. has a much older hypersonic missile program compared to China, whose dedicated hypersonic program started in the 2000s, and the DF-17 was unveiled in 2019.
China, however, moved much faster than the U.S. in testing and operationalizing the hypersonic missile program and is considered ahead in the hypersonic race. China has deployed its DF-17 across multiple People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rocket force brigades with Pacific-focused density while the U.S. has just reached its initial operational capability. Chinese missiles are now reportedly expanding into multiple generations of hypersonic weapons across land, sea, and potentially air. At the same time, the U.S. program faced multiple delays, technical challenges, and cost growth, with the U.S. still seeking a quantum leap in hypersonic technology. China accepted early, less sophisticated hypersonic systems into service rather than waiting for more advanced designs, giving its rocket force years of operational experience and production infrastructure before the U.S. had either.
Is the U.S. Catching Up?
As of mid-2026, the U.S. finally deployed the hypersonic missile “Dark Eagle,” with the U.S. Army in the Valiant Shield 2026 exercise in the Western Pacific, which could potentially hit targets around 2,175 miles away. The U.S. is narrowing the gap, but whether it closes it fully remains an open question, since technology-wise the U.S. is still a few years behind. DARPA’s request for industry feedback also supports the proposition that the U.S. has yet to find what it is looking for, but that does not imply that the U.S. is still at the baseline and may need to start from scratch. The U.S. understands the technology; it just seeks the correct tools to implement it effectively.
This, however, is just phase 0: the RFI does not commit any funding to a contractor. Rather, it is gathering information from industry to shape a future program’s technical requirements before any formal solicitation is issued. The U.S. is yet to find a good enough recipe to make a missile that will be a “quantum leap” in overall performance.
Conclusion
Whether the gap narrows depends upon the execution of DARPA rather than physics. Within the document, DARPA is explicitly courting non-traditional contractors to inject the kind of speed which the traditional defense-industrial base has not delivered. If NGHCM moves from phase 0 to a real program on schedule, the U.S. could produce a next-generation hypersonic cruise missile for testing within a few years. If this program also faces delays as HACM did, the U.S. will lag further behind in a race it has yet to lead.
About Shamil Abdullah Saleh
Shamil Abdullah Saleh is a Research Assistant at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Islamabad.
View all posts by Shamil Abdullah Saleh →
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